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SOLVING THE "INITIATORY CONSTRUCTION"
PUZZLE (AND IMPROVING DIRECT
DEMOCRACY) BY APPROPRIATE REFOCUSING

ON SPONSOR INTENT
GLENN C. SMITH*

This Article synthesizes and critiques a dozen years of scholarship
about judicial construction of legislation passed by voter initiative.
The Article then makes a comprehensive casefor an alternative approach: an appropriately enhanced focus on the intent of initiative
sponsors. More specifically, the Article validates, through analysis
of recent California decisions, a longstanding scholarly consensus
that the prevailingjudicialsearchfor "the intent of the voters" is seriouslyflawed. The Article provides the first synthesis to date of reform proposals offered by "initiatory-construction" scholars; the
discussion contends that these proposals collectively fail four key
evaluation criteria. Building on the 2003 work of an author who
pointed to the value of examining sponsor intent, this Article argues
that the earlierauthor was on the right track but gave an incomplete
defense and erred in the reform proposal he advocated. This Article
explains how an appropriatelyenhanced sponsor-intentfocus points
the way to meaningful proceduralreforms improving both the interpretation of initiatives and the processes of direct democracy.

Whether cause for dismay or celebration, direct democracy-the
process millions of Americans routinely use to adopt important state laws
outside the more familiar domain of representative lawmakingcontinues to grow in importance and impact. Each year direct democracy places on electoral ballots a broad range of important public-policy

2
controversies,1 which can trigger high-profile Supreme Court cases.

*
Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; Visiting Professor, Political
Science Dept., University of California, San Diego. J.D. 1978, New York University School
of Law; LL.M. 1979, Georgetown University Law Center. The author greatly appreciates the
valuable research assistance provided by Michael Eiland, Joanna Jacob, Caitlin Rae, and
Alicia Stratford, and the superb editorial suggestions and priceless ongoing support of Diane
Seaberg. The author also benefited from presenting a paper on the topic of this Article at the
July 2005 meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, and from discussing the
subject with California Western faculty members at an earlier presentation. Special appreciation is also due to California Western Dean Steven Smith, for his continuing encouragement.
1. See Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an
Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396-97 (2003) (describing issues
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The spending of millions of dollars to draft, qualify for the ballot, and
campaign about voter initiatives fuels a sophisticated "initiative industry."3 Elected officials who feel stymied in the traditional legislative
process use direct democracy to curry voter favor.4 And adoption of
crucial public policies by initiative obligates many judges to engage in

initiatory construction, the coined term that this Article employs for interpreting and applying laws passed by voter initiative after they survive
constitutional challenges. The substantial case law interpreting initiative-passed statutes has, in turn, spawned an extensive scholarship about
initiatory construction.
Given all these indicators of direct democracy's significance, it

ought to be of special concern that, according to the clear consensus of
initiatory-construction scholarship, the dominant approach courts use to
construe initiative-passed legislation is fundamentally bankrupt. Stu-

dents of initiatory construction have consistently shown that courts earnestly search for an "intent of the voters" that does not exist and against
which the processes and dynamics of direct democracy militate. Explicit
in the analysts' conclusions, and implicit in the many creative reform

proposals they have put forward, is a general agreement that the broken
initiatory-construction process is in urgent need of repair. Juxtaposed
against evidence of direct democracy's importance, the scholarship suggests a cruel irony: voters, public officials, private advocates, and judges

devote extravagant time and attention to consideration of initiatives with
big implications for personal liberty, political equality, and fiscal stability, with no guarantee that the resulting laws will be correctly interpreted
or faithfully implemented.

considered by voters during the 2000 elections as "school vouchers, physician-assisted suicide,
same-sex marriage... , gun control, campaign finance reform, bilingual education, gambling,
medical use of marijuana,... sentencing for drug offenders, ... tax reform and environmental
policy" (citations omitted)).
2.
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006) (challenge to Attorney General
policy contradicting Oregon right-to-die law passed by voter initiative); Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1 (2005) (commerce-clause-based challenge to federal Controlled Substance Act's
right to preempt "medical marijuana" laws passed by voter initiative in California and other
states); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (constitutional challenge
to Arizona initiative requiring use of English language by state officials); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996) (due-process-based challenge to Colorado's anti-gay-rights Amendment 2).
3.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 17, 20-21 (1997).
4.
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's backing of voter initiatives in a bid for
political advantage, see, e.g., Mark Martin, Governor Says He Will Call Special Election; Remark Counters Compromise Moves Toward Legislature, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 15, 2005, at B8, is
but one example of political officials seeking to ensconce favored policies through direct democracy. See, e.g., infra note 50 (juvenile-crime initiative offered by former California Governor Pete Wilson after legislature refused to pass similar bill).
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Initiatory construction and those who study or engage in it are now
at a very interesting crossroad. The consistent consensus about defects
has remained fundamentally unchallenged for long enough to merit confidence. Yet, more than ten years of proposing and critiquing is long
enough to have demonstrated the basic unworkability of the numerous
reform proposals. It is high time for a new approach.
Fortunately, the legal community does not have to look to exotic
places for relief. Rather, a promising alternative lies dormant in the initiatory-construction scholarship: an appropriately enhanced concern for
the intent of initiative sponsors. As this Article elaborates, such a sponsor-intent redirection would concentrate judicial attention on the persons
and entities likely to have formed a detailed, useful intent and jibe with
the structural and practical realities attending the relationship between
voter and sponsor. An appropriate refocusing on sponsor intent would
also avoid the deficiencies in the remedies proposed in the initiatoryconstruction scholarship to date. Of greatest importance to those who
take a dim view of direct democracy, refocusing on sponsor intent would
provide a new rationale for reforming the processes of initiative design
and deliberation in ways reformers have long championed but too infrequently accomplished. Such reforms would also reduce incentives for
abuse of the present system by initiative sponsors.
Part I of this Article synthesizes major facets of the consensus
emerging from more than a decade of initiatory-construction scholarship.
Part II highlights an under-noticed feature of initiatory construction: judicial disparagement and differential treatment of initiative sponsors as
compared to their analogous counterparts in the legislative arena, the legislators. Part III groups the various initiatory-construction reform proposals into four categories and offers the first detailed comparative
evaluation of their merits and limitations in terms of several evaluation
criteria. Part IV argues that the appropriate remedy is an enhanced focus
on sponsor intent and demonstrates that the only commentator to propose
this option to date has gone astray in his specific recommendations. Part
V explores how an appropriately reconceived focus on sponsor intent
could inform the design of optimal reforms for the deliberative procedures used for initiatives. Part VI suggests two further ways in which
additional scholarship could advance the cause of an appropriately enhanced focus on sponsor intent.
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Focus ON UNKNOWABLE VOTER INTENT

Initiatory construction was once the forgotten comer of directdemocracy scholarship. 5 That changed in 1995 with the publication of
Professor Jane Schacter's article analyzing "a set of fifty-three decisions... that represents ten years of published decisions by the highest
courts in the jurisdictions that permit voters to enact statutory law
through the initiative." 6 Since Schacter's article, initiatory construction
has been the subject of much serious study and comment-by a wide variety of professional academics, 7 judges and "players" in the initiative
9
8
and legislative processes, and law students.
This Part summarizes the impressive consensus among initiatoryconstruction scholars about how courts interpret voter-passed legislation.
The discussion also notes recent judicial opinions in California (the court
system deciding the lion's share of initiatory-construction cases) confirming and updating the lessons of the previous scholarship. Subpart A
explores how courts equate initiatory with statutory construction and
overwhelmingly search for the intent of the voters-the legislators of the
disputed initiatives-by examining the "formal" sources normally con5.
Before the current era of initiatory-construction scholarship, only a few prescient lawstudent authors called attention to the very real difficulties courts faced in applying an evergrowing number of complicated and controversial initiative-passed laws in concrete factual
contexts. See Kara Christenson, Note, Interpretingthe Purposesof Initiatives:Proposition 65,
40 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (1989); Christopher A. Coury, Student Note, Direct Democracy
Through Initiative and Referendum: Checking the Balance, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 573 (1994); Elizabeth McNellic, Note, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Popularly Enacted Legislation, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1989); Stephen H. Sutro,
Comment, Interpretation of Initiatives by Reference to Similar Statutes: Canons of Construction Do Not Adequately Measure Voter Intent, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 945 (1994).
6.
Jane Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 110 (1995).
7.
See Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct
Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477 (1996); Garrett, supra note 3; John Copeland
Nagle, DirectDemocracy and Hastily EnactedStatutes, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 535 (1996);
Michael M. O'Hear, Statutory Interpretationand Direct Democracy: Lessons From the Drug
Treatment Initiatives, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281 (2003); Staszewski, supra note 1; Leroy J.
Tornquist, Essay, Direct Democracy in Oregon-Some Suggestions for Change, 34
WILLAMETTE L. REV.675 (1998).
8.
See Craig B. Holman & Robert Stem, Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The
Changing Role of State and Federal Courts, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1239 (1998); Jack L. Landau, Interpreting Statutes Enacted by Initiative: An Assessment of Proposalsto Apply Specialized Interpretive Rules, 34 WILLAMET-rE L. REV. 487 (1998); Cathy R. Silak, The People Act,
the Courts React: A ProposedModel for InterpretingInitiatives in Idaho, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 1
(1996).
9.
See Richard Frankel, Note, Proposition 209: A New Civil Rights Revolution?, 18
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 431 (2000); Stephen Salvucci, Note, Say What You Mean and Mean
What You Say: The Interpretation of Initiatives in California,71 S.CAL. L. REV. 871 (1998);
Note, JudicialApproaches to DirectDemocracy, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2748 (2005).
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suited for fathoming the intentions of professional legislators. Subpart B
synthesizes the clear agreement among scholars that the search for voter
intent is a fool's errand. Subpart C points out errors in the dominant judicial methodology by highlighting several recent opinions propounding
an especially unrealistic version of voter intent.
A. Equating Statutory and Initiatory Construction
Professor Schacter's study demonstrates that judges typically equate
initiatory construction with statutory interpretation. They seek to discern
the intent of the "legislators" (citizen voters) who enacted the law in
question. 10 A recent survey of drug-treatment-initiative cases from California and Arizona confirms Schacter's finding.'1 And although no
other commentator has conducted a comprehensive case survey, other
initiatory-construction commentators have discussed cases that confirm
12
the point.
Searching for voter intent and equating statutory and initiatory construction continues to be a staple of opinion writing in California. For
example, the California Supreme Court focused on voter intent in several
recent cases. 13 One of these opinions even contains a vivid warning that
California courts construing voter initiatives should avoid interpreting
"in a way that the electorate did not contemplate: the voters should get
what they enacted, not more and not less." 14 Three of the opinions also
emphasize that judicial interpreters should subject initiatives to the same
interpretive rules that they apply to legislator-passed statutes. 15 Numer16
ous decisions from California appellate courts follow suit.
10.
Schacter, supra note 6, at 117-20.
11.
O'Hear, supra note 7, at 320 (supporting Schacter's finding that "courts employ the
same approaches to interpreting initiatives as they do to interpreting conventional statutes").
12.
See, e.g., Staszewski, supra note 1, at 418; Coury, supra note 5, at 577 (discussing
focus on voter "understanding" in Raven v. Deuknejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990)).
13.
See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 109 P.3d 564, 569 (Cal. 2005) (decision on youth sentencing attributed to "the voters of this state"); Robert L. v. Superior Court, 69 P.3d 951, 955
(Cal. 2003) (describing Court's task as "simply to interpret and apply the initiative's language
so as to effectuate the electorate's intent" (citation omitted)); Horwich v. Superior Court, 980
P.2d 927, 931 (Cal. 1999) (focusing on "the electorate's intended goal" in passing a certain
proposition); Hodges v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 433, 437 (Cal. 1999) ("we are obliged to interrogate the electorate's purpose.
14.
Hodges, 980 P.2d at 437.
15.
Robert L., 69 P.3d at 955 ("In interpreting a voter initiative.., we apply the same
principles that govern statutory construction." (citation omitted)); Horwich, 980 P.2d at 930
("guiding principles" of statutory construction "apply equally to the interpretation of voter initiatives").
16.
Judicial statements emphasizing voter intent appeared in four California appellate
cases decided within a three-month period in 2005. Silicon Valley Taxpayers Ass'n v. Santa
Clara County Open Space Auth., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 853, 862 (Ct. App. 2005) ("[W]e apply the

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

Professor Schacter's case survey also establishes that judges devote
much attention to "formal" sources of interpretation, such as the text of
the enacted initiative, information provided to voters in ballot pamphlets,
and "other statutes, including statutes related to the one being construed
and statutes in effect before the enactment of the one being construed;
any legislative history available for such other statutes; judicial decisions; administrative regulations, rulings [and] ...canons of statutory
construction." 17 Judges generally ignore the "informal" sources on
which voters typically rely to learn about initiatives; Schacter defines
these as "nonlegal, nongovernmental sources" such as how "media and
18
advertising" portray initiatives during the campaign to enact them.
Schacter calls this mismatch between what judges and voters focus on
"[t]he Paradox of the Inverted Informational Hierarchy."' 19 The more recent study of drug-treatment-initiative opinions confirms the focus on
"formal sources" to the exclusion of "informal" ones, 20 as do commentasame principles [in interpreting Proposition 218 that] we apply when interpreting a statute.");
Tain v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 330, 335 (Ct. App. 2005); Armijo v. Miles, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 623, 636 (Ct. App. 2005); Knight v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 687, 693 (Ct. App. 2005).
17.
Schacter, supra note 6, at 120.
18.
Id. at 120, 111.
19.
Id. at 130.
20.
O'Hear, supra note 7, at 320. Professor O'Hear does add an important "nuance that
is ...implicit in [Schacter's] findings." Id. at 321. As O'Hear observes:
[T]he search for "intent" occurs against a backdrop of public values that shape the
interpretive analysis. Courts identify the purposes implicit in the initiatives and
consider those purposes in light of the competing purposes embodied in other statutes ....While such an objective does not necessarily represent a rejection of intent, it does suggest that something more is going on than an inquiry into actual
voter preferences.
Id.
Professor O'Hear's purpose-informs-intent caveat should not make observers of the
initiatory-construction process overly sanguine. On legitimacy grounds, it ought to be, and
most judicial rhetoric and scholarly commentary assumes that it is, troubling if judges say one
thing and do another. (Such a "judicial wink" approach to construction is objectionable, as
Professor Schacter has observed, because it "conceals the limitations of popular lawmaking"
and "leaves the law to be covertly created by judges." Schacter, supra note 6, at 151-52.)
Further, on pragmatic grounds, it seems likely that some initiatory-construction judges are not
in on the joke; thus, regularly reciting a dubious doctrinal formulation is likely to mislead a
substantial number of initiative construers. Indeed, O'Hear's survey of drug-treatmentinitiative cases indicates some unsatisfactory judicial resolutions by courts flying under the
voter-intent flag. Finally, O'Hear's insight may have limited reach. As he recognizes, the
cases he reviewed may be "idiosyncratic," O'Hear, supra note 7, at 321. The drug-treatment
initiatives effected a targeted alteration in the well-known and well-established manner in
which the criminal-justice system deals with a discrete category of cases. Meaningful and accurate purposive analysis may be less reliable in the many initiative contexts in which the
scope and depth of intended change is larger and more uncertain.
Nevertheless, Professor O'Hear's cogent observation that some initiatoryconstruction courts may leaven a predominantly intentionalist approach with purposive season-
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tors analyzing judicial decisions not included within either the Schacter
21
or O'Hear studies.
More recent California cases again bear out the pattern. For example, in Horwich v. Superior Court,22 the California Supreme Court held
that Proposition 213, an initiative passed to limit tort recovery for uninsured motorists, did not preclude the parents of an uninsured motorist
from seeking non-economic damages in a wrongful-death action. While
not examining any informal sources, the Court considered the following
formal ones: the "Findings and Declaration of Purpose" stated in the initiative text; several sections of Proposition 213 language; the failure of
the initiative language to follow the practice of previous damagelimitation laws specifically referencing wrongful death; statutory construction canons such as the whole-act rule, the rule against surplusage,
and the rule to avoid absurd results; arguments in favor of the Proposition appearing in the ballot pamphlet; the explanation of the neutral "legislative analyst"; and the fact that previous California liability decisions
do not erect an "absolute" rule on wrongful-death defendants asserting
defenses. 2 3 Other California Supreme Court decisions, as well as intermediate appellate decisions, show a similar use of formal interpretive
24
sources and a failure to credit informal sources.
B.

Scholarly Consensus that Voter Intent Is Illusory

The initiatory-construction literature over the last ten-plus years also
reflects a substantial consensus that voter intent is an illusory commoding provides another justification for the enhanced focus on sponsor intent proposed by this
Article. As noted later, see infra text accompanying note 161, one justification for an enhanced focus on sponsor intent is that it would help provide additional helpful evidence of initiative purposes.
21.
See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 7, at 537-41; Silak, supra note 8, at 24; Sutro, supra note
5, at 959, 959-60 n.68.
22.
980 P.2d 927 (Cal. 1999).
23.
See id. at 930-36.
24.
See, e.g., Robert L.'v. Superior Court, 69 P.3d 951, 955-61 (Cal. 2003) ("ordinary
meaning" of proposition's language; departure from language of comparable previous provisions; technical-vs.-ordinary-words canon; "whole act" rule; findings and declarations section;
statements in ballot materials by initiative supporters and legislative analyst; canon to avoid
absurd results); Hodges v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 433, 437-39 (Cal. 1999) (findings and
declarations section; statements in ballot materials by proposition supporters and opponents
and legislative analyst; canon to avoid absurd results); Silicon Valley Taxpayers Ass'n v.
Santa Clara County Open Space Auth., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 853, 863-64, 867-69 (Ct. App. 2005)
(plain meaning of text; canon regarding narrow construction of exceptions; preamble and title
of proposition; comparison to existing common-law definition; proponent statements in ballot
pamphlet); In re Brent F., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 833, 834-36 (Ct. App. 2005) (plain meaning of initiative text; prior judicial interpretation of related statutory section; rule that specific legislation
trumps more general enactment).
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ity. The initiatory-construction literature reflects three primary bases on
which to doubt that initiative voters will ever form the kind of detailed,
meaningful intent necessary for accurate initiative interpretation.
First, the literature harnesses substantial macro- and micro-level
empirical evidence demonstrating that voters are unlikely to understand
lengthy and complicated initiative texts 25 or "ballot pamphlet" explanations. 26 Initiatory-construction commentators also cite survey data more
broadly indicating that voters do not feel comfortable or informed about
initiatives. 2 7 These voter attitudes apply both to highly controversial ini28
tiatives and to "less controversial but more common propositions."
Data indicate that voter uncertainty reduces levels of voter participation--especially for voters with lower education levels and socioeconomic status.2 9 Survey data even confirm that an appreciable per30
centage of voters end up voting "contrary to stated intentions."
A second dimension of the consensus is anecdotal. Commentators
have collected numerous examples of voter behavior that seems illinformed, counter-intuitive, or self-defeating. For example, initiatoryconstruction commentators note the likelihood that California's antiaffirmative-action Proposition 209 only passed because "[m]any voters
who supported the measure did not associate it with the end of measures
31
designed to help members of racial minorities."
25.
See, e.g., Sutro, supra note 5, at 955 n.44 (citation omitted) (California election in
1988 included 13 initiatives over 5000 words long; 1990 election included 4 initiatives ranging
from 9,735 words to 15,633 words).
26.
See, e.g., Silak, supra note 8, at 31 ("a recent voters' pamphlet in California ran 159
pages, and averaged forty-five words per sentence ....
");id. ("Studies suggest a reading level
comparable to a third-year college student would be needed for most voters' pamphlets." (citing DAVID MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 36, 138-39 (1984))).
27.
See, e.g., Silak, supra note 8, at 30 n. 179 (majority of voters surveyed in four western
states agreed that initiatives "were 'so complicated that one cannot understand what is going
on"' (citing THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 74 (1989)); id. at 30 ("As many as one-third of voters say they
...either vote at random or abstain from voting at all on a measure." (citing MAGLEBY, supra
note 26, at 187)).
28.
See Sutro, supra note 5, at 952 n.31 (quoting MAGLEBY, supra note 26, at 129 and
CRONIN, supra note 27, at 74) (study of highly publicized nuclear-power initiative in which
only "between 10 and 33 percent of the voters were well enough informed to make educated
judgments"; "35 percent or more" of voters not aware of "less controversial but more common
propositions").
29.
See Staszewski, supra note 1, at 418-19.
30.
See Sutro, supra note 5, at 952 n.31 (citing CRONIN, supra note 27, at 74).
31.
Frankel, supra note 9, at 447 (citing evidence from opinion poll questions and extrapolations from exit polls). Similar anecdotes from outside California include a 1991 Washington State abortion initiative whose near-defeat was attributed to voter confusion, see Sutro,
supra note 5, at 952 n.34, and a 1992 Arizona ballot proposition (altering the State Mine Inspector's term of office), which voters approved despite the complete irrelevance of mining
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A third facet of the consensus against meaningful voter intent focuses on the many ways in which direct democracy's procedures and dynamics militate against the formation of sophisticated voter intent. Many
initiatory-construction commentators note that, unlike the legislative
process, initiative sponsors do not usually feel the need to consult other
political officials or the voters who elected them when developing and
planning initiative proposals. 32 The process by which initiatives are then
qualified for the ballot emphasizes quick, unthinking voter signatures
rather than sophisticated public education and discussion. 33 The election
campaign is mostly conducted through simplistic, and, at times, misleading, slogans in short, emotional advertisements and in media "sound
bites."' 34 Ballot pamphlet materials are general and thematic and are often as simplistic and emotional as the ad campaigns. 35 At most, voters
accurately read "heuristic" cues, such as the positions of interest groups,
political parties, or individual political officials and develop a "general"
36
or "rough" sense of what an initiative seeks to do.
C. Especially ImplausibleJudicialAttributions of Voter Intent
As initiatory-construction scholars have recognized, courts often
draw highly detailed and implausible conclusions about the intent of initiative voters. The much-analyzed decision in People v. Castro37 is a
paradigmatic example of the California Supreme Court attributing a particularly refined intent to "the people" who adopted the proposition in
question (California's Proposition 8 "Victims' Bill of Rights"). The
Castro plurality attributed to voters an intent "to restore trial court discretion" over whether to admit evidence of prior felony convictions in a
later criminal trial "and to reject the rigid, black letter rules of exclusion"

issues to the vast majority of the state, see Coury, supra note 5, at 582.
32.
See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 9, at 439; Nagle, supra note 7, at 541 ("[V]oters lack
the power to bargain about the scope or language of a proposed [initiative] measure."); Sutro,
supra note 5, at 949 n.22.
33.
See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 3, at 20; Staszewski, supra note 1, at 425.
34.
See, e.g., Silak, supra note 8, at 29-30; Staszewski, supra note 1, at 427-29.
35.
See, e.g., Coury, supra note 5, at 587-88 (examples from 1992 California and Arizona ballot pamphlets); Silak, supra note 8, at 31 (citing MAGLEBY, supra note 26, at 138-39);
Sutro, supranote 5, at 954 n.42 (quoting CRONIN, supra note 27, at 82).
36.
See Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "Disclosure Plus," 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1149-59
(2003); see Coury, supra note 5, at 593 (distinguishing between allowing voters to "approve
understandable general policies" and expecting them to master "details"); Sutro, supra note 5,
at 593 (voters may understand "purpose" of initiatives, but that "does not mean ... voters are
able to advance judgments on the origins of a word, phrase, or sentence").
37.
696 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1985).
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created by later state court decisions. 38 In part, the plurality credited
voters with sophisticated knowledge about, and a desire to work harmoniously with, existing admissibility rules in the California Evidence
Code. 39 Castro also attributed to voters arcane knowledge about the interaction between two different subsections of Proposition 8.40
More modem California courts have continued in the Castro tradition. In Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. San Jose,4 1 the California Supreme Court concluded that the voters who enacted Proposition 209, an
anti-affirmative-action proposition: (1) understood the twists and turns in
federal civil-rights cases from Weber through Bakke; (2) "intended to reinstitute the interpretation of the Civil Rights Act and equal protection
that predated Weber"; but (3) "[p]lainly ... intended to preserve outreach
efforts to disseminate information about public employment, education,
42
and contracting not predicated on an impermissible classification."
Anyone familiar with the excruciating intricacies of affirmative-action
jurisprudence knows that it is "plainly" unlikely that California's nonlawyer voters made the fine distinctions the Hi-Voltage Wire Works court
attributed to them.
Even more recent examples of unrealistic voter-intent attribution
can be found in the California Supreme Court cases of Robert L. v. Superior Court4 3 and People v. Thomas.4 4 Robert L. required the court to determine whether sentence-enhancement provisions in an initiative relating to gang violence and juvenile crime applied to every misdemeanor
and felony or only to "wobblers" (i.e., "public offenses that are punishable, in the alternative, as a misdemeanor or a felony," as officials see
fit). 45 The majority's decision that the sentence-enhancement scheme
was broadly applicable makes sense in light of the general anti-youthcrime goal of initiative sponsors. Parts of the rationale by which the
Robert L. majority reached its logical holding, however, border on the
absurd. The court attributes to voters (1) a highly sophisticated appreciation of subtle departures from the textual language used in related legal
provisions and (2) knowledge of statutorily defined or "commonly understood" criminal-law terms, but not arcane "legal term[s] of art of recent vintage." 46 Thomas in turn attributed to California voters the view
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 117.
See Silak, supra note 8, at 51 (citing Castro,696 P.2d at 115).
See id.
12 P.3d 1068 (Cal. 2000).
Id. at 1083, 1085.
69 P.3d 951 (Cal. 2003).
109 P.3d 564 (Cal. 2005).
Robert L., 69 P.3d at 953.
Id. at 956.
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that "the trial court's discretionary authority under Penal Code section
1170.19, subdivision (a), to commit a minor to the Youth Authority applies only when the minor meets the eligibility requirements of Welfare
and Institutions Code section 1732.6." 4 7 The electorate developed this
specific intent, the court found, even though "[r]esolving this issue require[d] the interpretation and cross-referencing of five statutes from two
48
different codes."
II.

THE LACK OF FOCUS ON SPONSOR INTENT

When construing initiatives, courts do not devote to fathoming the
intent of the sponsors of these measures the significant energies they routinely devote to discerning the intent of ordinary legislation drafters. In
fact, at times, courts overtly disparage sponsor intent. This contrasts
markedly with the treatment typically afforded to legislative drafters.
Initiatory-construction decisions evince disinterest in sponsor intent
in two main ways. First, some initiatory-construction courts overtly assert the independent irrelevance of sponsor intent. For example, the
2003 Robert L. opinion specifically upbraided an appellate court it
largely affirmed for analyzing the history of "failed legislative efforts"
undertaken by the sponsors of Proposition 21.49 Even though the appellate court explained why the past legislative background was highly relevant, 50 the Robert L. Supreme Court majority declared that the inferior
court had "go[ne] too far." 5 1 California's highest court emphasized that
it "has never strayed from [its] pronouncement.., that 'legislative antecedents' 'not directly presented to the voters ...

inquiry.' '"52

are not relevant to our

Second, other courts more subtly signal the irrelevance of

47.
Thomas, 109 P.3d at 565.
48.
Id. at 568.
49.
Robert L., 69 P.3d at 957.
50.
Robert L. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 716, 721 (Ct. App. 2001). The appellate court argued that "it is useful to understand the historical underpinnings" of Proposition 21
because it "traces it [sic] roots back to former Governor Pete Wilson." Id. The court went on
to explain: "In 1998, then-Governor Wilson sponsored a legislative crime package designed to
overhaul the juvenile justice system and crack down on juvenile offenders. That legislation
was defeated, but it was repackaged and put on the ballot as Proposition 21." Id. (citations
omitted). The court asserted: "By studying the defeated legislation, we can gain valuable insight into how the framers of Proposition 21 intended that initiative to operate." Id.
51.
Robert L., 69 P.3d at 957.
52.
Id. at 958 (citations omitted). The Court concluded: "Thus, to the extent the Court of
Appeal, in ascertaining the voters' intent, relied on evidence of the drafters' intent that was not
presented to the voters, we decline to follow it. Instead, we look to the materials that were before the voters." Id. This aversion to sponsor-intent indicators follows in the tradition of Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair PoliticalPractices Committee, 799 P.2d 1220
(Cal. 1990), a leading California decision much discussed by the initiatory-construction litera-
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sponsor intent as a separate interpretive source by referring to sponsors
and voters as an undifferentiated entity and attributing to voters an intent
that is only likely to have been possessed by sponsors. The 1999 Horwich ruling illustrates this subtler brand of sponsor denigration by indiscriminately attributing to the drafters of Proposition 213 and "'the voters
who enact[ed] it"' an awareness of how previous California statutes limited wrongful-death recovery. 5 3 Of course, detailed past-case awareness
54
only makes sense when ascribed to drafters.
However courts choose to express their disinterest about sponsor intent, it stands in marked relief to how judges handle the intent of the
drafters of ordinary legislation. True, state courts do at times refuse to
rely on indicators of the intent of legislative sponsors or supporters because they have special reasons to doubt that legislators relied on it in
voting to enact a statute. Many other statutory-construction cases, however, indicate a more routine reliance on a wide variety of drafter-intent
sources. 55 Courts engaging in statutory construction often do not inquire

into the likelihood of legislator reliance-even when the realities of legislative dynamics suggest that they should. And there is simply no analogue in statutory construction to the routine initiatory-construction practice of refusing to credit key statements of sponsor intent, such as the
press releases or background papers that sponsors produce to explain and
champion their initiatives, because the communications were not in56
cluded in the official voter pamphlet.
ture. As the Taxpayers court stated: "[t]he opinion of drafters... who sponsor an initiative is
not relevant since such opinion does not represent the intent of the electorate and we cannot
say with assurance that the voters were aware of the drafters' intent." Id. at 1232 n.10 (citations omitted). A number of lower California decisions follow suit. See, e.g., Knight v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687, 690 (Ct. App. 2005) (ignoring alleged intent of proponents
because even "[i]f this were the intention of the proponents ....the electorate was not given
the opportunity to vote on that undisclosed objective").
53.
980 P.2d 927, 934 (Cal. 1999) (quoting In re Harris, 775 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Cal.
1989)). A number of other decisions reflexively equate sponsors and voters. See, e.g., Hodges
v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 433, 437 (Cal. 1999) ("It is not clear that anyone--eitherthe sponsors of the measure or the voters-intended to protect [manufacturers] from products liability
claims ....); People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111, 116-17 (Cal. 1985).
54.
The Court acknowledged this implicitly by referring in the immediately following
sentence only to "the drafters of Proposition 213" and not the voters. Horwich, 980 P.2d at
934-35.
55.
See, e.g., In re Dannenburg, 104 P.3d 783, 793 (Cal. 2005) (relying on wider historical circumstances of the bill's enactment); In re J.W., 57 P.3d 363, 370-71 (Cal. 2002) (relying on Senate Judiciary Committee and Senate Finance Committee analysis of Senate Bill
amending California Family Code § 7895); Maben v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 439, 442
(Ct. App. 1967) (relying on Legislative Counsel's bill digest, attesting to change in law).
56.
For example, in Martin v. Szeto, 84 P.3d 374, 377 (Cal. 2004), the California Supreme Court interpreted California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.7 by looking to
statements in a letter from the bill's sponsors to the Governor and a recounting of the bill's
history by the ACLU's Legislative Director.
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Indeed, it is in states allowing sponsors to make arguments in official voter pamphlets that the lack of parity between initiatory construction and statutory construction becomes especially obvious. Ballotpamphlet states such as California ignore the long-accepted assumption
that statements by legislation supporters (especially sponsors!) are entitled to greater weight than statements by opponents. 5 7 California courts
routinely discuss the views of initiative sponsors and opponents as a
package, as though they are of equal significance. 5 8 California courts
also accord substantial significance to what official government analysts
say about the scope and intent of initiatives, 5 9 even though these officials
have no connection to, or duty to speak accurately on behalf of, initiative
sponsors. To the extent that initiatives seek to challenge the legal status
quo in which these "neutral" officials are invested, initiatoryconstruction courts following the California practice may be stacking the
deck against sponsor intent.
III. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING INITIATORY CONSTRUCTION: A
CRITICAL EVALUATION

Despite very ingenious and sincere efforts by initiatory-construction
commentators to go beyond merely pointing to a problem, scholars have
split significantly on how to respond to the incoherence of voter intent.
All of the divergent reform proposals have serious theoretical and practical problems. Perhaps because of these deficiencies, no reform proposal
has been adopted in the years since initiatory-construction scholars began
showing the bankruptcy of the current method of determining voter intent.
This Part engages in the first synthesis and comparative critique of
the last ten-plus years of proposals to improve initiatory construction.
Subpart A delineates four relevant criteria for evaluating the reform pro-

57.

See, e.g., Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 139 (1983); WILLIAM N.

ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY

INTERPRETATION 303, 307 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT] (noting
importance of "explanatory statements by the sponsors orfloor managers of legislation").
See, e.g., Robert L. v. Superior Court, 69 P.3d 951, 959-60 (Cal. 2003) (relying on
58.
fact that opponents of initiative "specifically made the voters aware that Proposition 21 would
enhance the punishment of gang-related misdemeanors"); Hodges, 980 P.2d at 438 (indiscriminately discussing "[t]he arguments for and against the measure"); People v. Skinner, 704
P.2d 752, 758 (Cal. 1985) (noting failure of "arguments for or against Proposition 8" to mention insanity-defense provision).
59.
See, e.g., Horwich, 980 P.2d at 932; Armijo v. Miles, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 623, 637 (Ct.
App. 2005) (relying on Legislative Analyst explanation of Proposition 22 emphasizing marriage, not domestic partnership); Knight v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687, 695-96 (Ct.
App. 2005) (same).
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posals. Subpart B then identifies, analyzes, and ultimately finds deficient
four different categories of reforms.
A.

Criteriafor Evaluatingthe Reform Proposals

This Article evaluates the initiatory-construction reform proposals
in terms of four criteria: 1) the extent to which the proposal seems likely
to remedy, in a proportionate way, key aspects of the generally agreed
upon problem, 2) the extent to which the proposal necessarily assumes
the inferiority of direct democracy, 3) whether the proposed judicial task
is manageable, and 4) whether the proposed judicial task is legitimate.
1.

Remedying Key Problem Aspects in a Proportional Way

Constitutional-law doctrines provide several useful tools for assessing the validity of governmental remedial measures. Two related tools
are especially helpful in evaluating the initiatory-construction reform
proposals: the extent to which a remedial action actually reduces a real
problem, 60 and the existence of "a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end. ''6 1 To the extent that reform proposals proportionally solve the
problems created by initiatory-construction courts looking in the wrong
place and finding voter intent at an unrealistically specific level, they
gain validity. By contrast, a proposal is ineffective if it either overresponds or under-responds, and, especially, if it remediates at an unacceptable cost.
2.

Not Disparaging Direct Democracy

Both substantively and practically, proposed remedies gain by not
requiring their adopters to embrace any particular viewpoint about the
validity of direct democracy.
60.
For example, in applying First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, courts ask whether governmental means actually further governmental interests that are
at least legitimate. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 681-82

(7th ed. 2004) (summarizing basic equal-protection and substantive-due-process analysis); id.
at 1131-35 (summarizing levels of means/end scrutiny for content-based and content-neutral
speech regulation).
61.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520, 530 (1997) ("The appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one." (citations
omitted)).
Use of Boerne's standards to inform this evaluation criterion is not intended to endorse the Court's application of them in Boerne or its progeny.
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Scholars and other commentators have subjected the initiative process to a sustained and extensive critique on a variety of theoretical and
practical grounds 62-including the lack of core deliberative and accountability-promoting features attributed to the republican form of government, which emphasizes policymaking by elected legislatures. 63 But the
literature also abounds with extensive and recent rejections of the view
that direct democracy's failings should consign it to second-class status.
Some extol direct democracy's virtues. 64 Others do not elevate direct
democracy so much as dispute the precepts behind the view that representative legislation is meaningful. 65 There is not now, and may never
be, consensus on the question of direct democracy's comparative validity. Thus, proposals locating themselves on one side of the skirmish are
vulnerable to all the substantive arguments from the other.
Proposals that do not disparage direct democracy also have a significant practical advantage, given that state-court judges hear the vast

62.
Staszewski, supra note 1, at 397-98 n.8 (citing articles and concluding: "Some advocate the outright abolition of initiative lawmaking on constitutional grounds; some advocate
increased regulation of the procedures by which proposed measures are enacted; and others
advocate more stringent judicial review of successful ballot measures.").
63.
Others see direct democracy as failing populist principles. See, e.g., O'Hear, supra
note 7, at 287 n.41 (citing and quoting articles by Professors Sherman Clark and Richard
Collins).
64.
For example, one author argues that direct democracy has "been an important impetus
for both procedural and substantive reforms" including "some of the turning points in
American legal history." Note, supra note 9, at 2765 (specifying "women's suffrage, the abolition of the poll tax, the establishment of the eight-hour work day, and campaign finance regulations" (quoting Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice
Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 707, 708 (1991))). The author also collects examples and
assessments of direct democracy as an important "mechanism to promote the rights of the
powerless and the dispossessed" and to serve as a "safety valve" in checking "dysfunctional"
electoral government. Id. at 2763-65; see, e.g., Coury, supra note 5, at 573 (linking direct
democracy to checking and balancing regular governmental procedures).
65.
A number of commentators question the importance or primacy of republican deliberation. For example, Professor Tushnet asks whether deliberation serves any value if it does
not improve the underlying quality of the decision. See Mark Tushnet, Fearof Voting: Differential Standards ofJudicial Review ofDirect Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 373, 38183. Tushnet further argues that deliberative processes "reinforce hierarchies that direct legislation is partly designed to overcome." Id. at 383.
A still different mode of frequent attack is to value deliberation but doubt that the
normal legislative process exhibits it predictably or meaningfully, when compared to direct
democracy. See, e.g., Landau, supra note 8, at 516-21 (arguing that similar deliberative problems attend state legislation, although not necessarily with the same frequency as with direct
democracy); O'Hear, supra note 7, at 327 n.305 (differences between direct democracy and
representative lawmaking "may be particularly unimportant in smaller states with fewer legislative resources"); Tushnet, supra at 379 ("One can, of course, readily compile anecdotes
demonstrating distortions in campaigns for direct legislation. But for each anecdote there is
another showing how representative bodies adopt important legislation with deliberation of no
better quality.").
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bulk of initiatory-construction challenges. 6 6 Many state judges are
elected initially or are at least subject to reelection or recall. 67 Thus, "as
a practical matter, elected judges considering a popular initiative must
face the same voters who enacted it to keep their judicial seats."'68 These
judges may be especially reluctant to act in ways appearing to interfere
with the popular will. 6 9 Even state judges not facing immediate electoral
accountability could be disinclined to swim upstream against a strong
current of support for direct democracy from their state's officials and
voters. Some state judges could encounter state constitutional provisions
70
seeming to require strong judicial loyalty to the initiative process.
In sum, a separate and critical consideration for evaluating proposals to respond to the deficiencies of initiatory construction is that they not
require judicial implementers to take an anti-direct-democracy stance or
become judicial "profiles in courage."

66.
See Garrett, supra note 3, at 35 (explaining why state-judge attitudes are "important"). Professor Staszewski's suggestion that litigants could bypass state courts by raising
federal claims and seeking "liberal application" of supplemental jurisdiction to permit federal
courts to engage in initiatory construction as well, see Staszewski, supra note 1, at 454-55
n.227, does not ultimately offer a useful end-run. First, the vast majority of initiatoryconstruction disputes only call for construction of initiatives under state law, not rulings as
well on their federal constitutional validity. Second, even if federal judges took jurisdiction
over an initiatory-construction case, they would end up applying the same pro-directdemocracy "law of the state," unless they disingenuously bent that law (which would raise its
own set of legitimacy issues). Finally, lower federal courts would likely be affected by the
United States Supreme Court's reverential intonings in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), and later cases that direct democracy represents the will of
the people and is comparable to the New England town meeting "as both a practical and symbolic part of our democratic processes," id. at 672-73; see Staszewski, supra note 1, at 415-17
(discussing City of Eastlake and later cases).
67.
See ROBERT A. CARP, RONALD STIDHAM & KENNETH L. MANNING, JUDICIAL
PROCESS IN AMERICA 102 (2004) ("The election of judges.., is the norm in the states."); id.
at 104-105 (describing how even judges appointed initially by "merit selection" can face contentious retention votes).
68.
Gerald F. Uelmen, Handling Hot Potatoes:Judicial Review of CaliforniaInitiatives
After Senate v. Jones, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 999, 1000 (2001), quoted in Staszewski, supra note 1, at 454 n.227.
69.
See Silak, supra note 8, at 35 (noting state judicial awareness that voters are invested
in direct democracy); Staszewski, supra note 1, at 454-55 n.227 (paraphrasing late California
Supreme Court Justice Otto Klaus: "[R]eviewing controversial cases is like having a crocodile
in the bathtub while shaving-although one attempts to ignore the threat of voter reprisal for
such decisions, one always knows it is there.;).
70.
See Jaysen Oldroyd, Utah at the Crossroads: The Role of the Judiciary in Initiative
and Severability Law after Gallivan v. Walker, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 367, 377 (2003) (analyzing
Utah Supreme Court decision that voters have "fundamental right" under Utah Constitution to
enact laws by initiative).
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Manageability

To borrow from another domain of constitutional law, any proposal
to alter the current approach to legal decision making should envision
"judicially discoverable and manageable standards." 7 1 Any reform proposal is in serious trouble if it leaves judges and those who must deal
with them to guess the appropriate decisional criteria or have no confidence that they can be applied with minimal objectivity and rigor.
4.

Legitimacy

This criterion relates in part to the manageability criterion; asking
judges to do something unmanageable makes the judicial enterprise "illegitimate" because decisional results will vary and appear arbitrary. But
carving out the legitimacy of the proposed judicial role as a separate concern underlines the reality that some judicial assignments, even if clearly
manageable, could be illegitimate for other reasons.
Legitimacy has long been a patently relevant criterion for evaluating
the judicial role in construing legislative statutes. Statutory-construction
methodologies enabling judges to ignore or even depart from the will of
the people's representatives raise a host of concerns, including jeopardizing majority rule and disordering the separation of powers. That is why
the legitimacy of the judicial role figures prominently in scholarly commentary 7 2 and in judicial writing, both in statutory-construction opinions
and elsewhere. 73 Concerns might be even weightier when an initiatoryconstruction methodology would lead judges to countermand "the will of
the people" themselves. 74 As noted by one prominent scholar of both
71.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Invocation of Baker does not assert the validity of the Court's subsequent applications of Baker to nonjusticiable-political-question

claims.
72.

See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETr, CASES

AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 687

(2001) [hereinafter 2001 ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT] (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes's
insistence inTHE COMMON LAW 41, 44 (1881), "that in a 'government of laws, not men' legal
standards must be external to the decisionmaker"); Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence
and the Canons, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1389 (2005).
73.
See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985) (Marshall, J.) (adhering rigidly to statutory deadline because "the fact that Congress might have acted with greater clarity
or foresight does not give courts a carte blanche to redraft statutes in an effort to achieve that
which Congress is perceived to have failed to do"); People v. Davis, 938 P.2d 938, 949 (Cal.
1997) (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("Judges are constrained by the law.... [O]ur guideposts in
interpreting the Three Strikes law [passed both by the legislature and by voter initiative] must
be the usual principles of statutory construction that apply in every case, not our projections of
the hopes and fears that led to the statute's enactment.").
74.
This is not to argue that there is a deeply meaningful public will, or that it is likely to
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legislative and initiatory construction, initiative interpreters still need to
75
show "respect for. . . the people as lawmakers."
B.

The Initiatory-ConstructionReform Proposals:Synthesis and
ComparativeEvaluation

It facilitates analysis of the varying reform proposals emerging from
the decade-plus of initiatory-construction scholarship to group them into
four categories. 76 First, several commentators envision courts continuing
to search for voter intent but doing so with a wider range of materials and
more extensive judicial fact-finding processes. Second, a leading legislation scholar and initiatory-construction commentator posits that courts
should bring more categorical skepticism to interpreting initiatives than
they do to interpreting legislation. The third category urges selective
skepticism of proposals based on substantive or process distinctions.
The fourth and most ambitious and ambiguous approach would empower
courts in post-enactment litigation to provide a substitute for the missing
77
deliberation.
1.

Expansion of the Voter-Intent Search

In the most well-developed iteration of this approach, 78 after examining initiative texts and "official extrinsic materials" distributed to vot-

reveal coherent and detailed popular intentions. Rather, it is merely to note that current initiatory-construction modes assume that it is highly legitimate to follow popular will.
75.
Frickey, supra note 7, at 510.
76.
This Article withholds consideration of Professor Staszewski's proposal to subject
initiative sponsors to federal administrative-rulemaking procedures until Part IV.
77.
Even though it appears that courts could avoid the error of searching for voter intent
by rejecting intentionalism in favor of textualism, initiatory-construction scholars have correctly resisted this move. Sole reliance on a purely textual approach to fathoming the wishes
of initiative sponsors (as opposed to also using non-textual means for ascertaining sponsor intent) would be unwise for several reasons. First, a shift to textualism is practically unlikely in
the substantial number of states in which intentionalism is the reigning approach for statutes
and initiatives. (Adopting a different, more restrictive textual regime only for initiatives would
imply disparagement of direct democracy and therefore encounter the earlier-cited difficulties.) More important, the numerous valid objections lodged against textualism for statutessee, e.g., 2000 ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 57, at 230-36 (the inherent malleability of statutory words and the canons of construction used to apply them; the unlikelihood
that text alone can meaningfully capture the nuances of drafter intentions and purposes; and
the "alarming" risk of "sever[ing] the connection between democracy and the rule of law"
when textualism ignores how law enactors "seek to solve a social problem in the face of disagreement")-are equally applicable to voter-adopted legislation.
78.
See Silak, supra note 8, at 37-38. Two earlier student authors also endorsed enhanced-voter-intent searches. See McNellie, supra note 5, at 176-79; Frankel, supra note 9, at
439-43.
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ers, courts would consult a potentially wide array of unofficial sources,
such as "news reports, the transcripts of any recorded debates between
proponents and opponents of the initiative, campaign literature from both
sides, editorials by news media, and advertising." 79 During litigation
over initiative meaning, courts could also access "printed material" or
"videotaped material, [including] television reports or commercials,"
presented as attachments to affidavits. 80 To assist their analysis of this
expanded material, courts would likely use "social science expert witness
opinions," such as a "political scientist who had been a keen observer of
a particular political controversy... [and who] might be called as an expert witness to provide context.., as to the perceived problem to be corrected." 8 1 Courts would ultimately develop "a hierarchy of such [extrin82
sic] aids that they will rely upon for initiatives."
Proposals that judges expand their search for voter intent respond
directly to one aspect of the consensus critique of current initiatory construction; the proposals focus judges on the sources voters more likely
use. 8 3 More fundamentally, however, expanded-voter-intent approaches
run against the grain of the initiatory-construction literature by searching
even more elaborately for the detailed,specific voter intent that scholars
argue is nonexistent. The dynamics and data canvassed in Part I indicate
that, when voters consult advertisements, editorials, and the like, they
probably do no more than "grasp the broad purpose of an initiative
measure and vote either to approve or reject a general policy." 84 Lack of
control over initiative drafting, lack of meaningful discussion during the
election campaign, the low probability that advertisements will traffic in
"the arcane, albeit potent, details" of the initiatives they tout or disparage, 85 and many other factors, make it unrealistic to expect the kind of
specific intent in which most initiatory-construction lawsuits traffic.

79.
Silak, supra note 8, at 40.
80.
Id. at 40-41.
81.
Id. at 41. In appropriate cases, such as a case requiring judges to understand the intent behind a property-tax initiative, recourse could be made to knowledgeable "representatives of state agencies who have studied certain issues." Id.
82.
Id. at 40.
83.
See id. at 38 ("Because the voters' intent was developed after exposure to a variety of
material... the court must be willing to, and indeed must seek out, the evidence of what the
voters' considered before voting.").
84.
Staszewski, supra note 1, at 409 ("[J]udicial inquiry into the media accounts and advertising that actually influenced the voters is unlikely to yield any unbiased or determinate
answers to the interpretive questions facing courts."); see supra text accompanying notes 2536.
85.
O'Hear, supra note 7, at 334 (quoting Schacter's concern that "[b]road[,] visceral appeals" of initiative advertisements "forcefully distract the electorate from the arcane, albeit
potent, details").
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Thus, expanded-voter-intent-search proposals risk exacerbating the
basic problems of current initiatory construction while gaining very little
in return, which makes them highly disproportionate as remedies. 86 Little would be gained from such proposals because recourse to "informal"
intent sources would rarely reveal a general voter intent not already discernible from the formal sources now readily consulted by initiatoryconstruction courts. 87 Certainly, an expanded voter-intent search would
have yielded little in People v. Castro, the initiatory-construction decision cited by the most prominent advocate of expanded voter intent to
illustrate the validity of her approach. 88 Castro involved exactly the kind
of question on which voters are unlikely to have formed a specific intent
using any set of sources. 89 And Castro is precisely the kind of case in
which the voters' generic intent (a general get-tough-on-crime attitude) is
90
easily read from the initiative text and other "formal" sources.
86.
Expanded-voter-intent-search proposals could be disproportionate in other ways. For
example, Silak's initial focus on erroneous official voter-intent indicators, rather than unofficial and more accurate sources, might cause courts to fail to access or fully credit unofficial
sources. Furthermore, Silak's broad definition of relevant unofficial materials might also
cause courts to lose their way, producing a less accurate reading of voter intent than if they
focused on a narrower range of especially relevant materials.
87.
One of Silak's three case studies does indicate the value of looking at an initiative's
"legislative history" beyond what is contained in the "official extrinsic" documents. See Missourians for Honest Elections v. Mo. Elections Comm'n, 536 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)
(specific issue directly and repetitively addressed in campaign materials likely to have been
seen by voters, but not suggested in initiative text). However, the difficulty with this example
is that it is so atypical.
88.
Silak, supra note 8, at 48-56 (discussing and critiquing People v. Castro, 696 P.2d
111 (Cal. 1985) (plurality opinion)).
89.
Silak admits implicitly that no detailed rummaging through expanded voter-intent
sources could hope to establish any such intent by millions of California voters. Indeed, Silak
argues that the plurality should have credited the voters' "general expression of intent" for a
"broad reform of procedures and the desire to achieve more criminal convictions." Silak, supra note 8, at 54-55.
90.
It was not necessary to consult "the advertising campaign waged by the proponents
and opponents, [or] the transcripts of any debates that took place," id. at 54, to find this broad
intent. Instead, it appeared in the Proposition's preamble (and in the "Victims' Bill of Rights"
title!), as well as the ballot pamphlet argument that is "official extrinsic evidence" routinely
consulted by California courts. Id. at 52.
The same critique applies to another Silak case study, In re Estate of Olson, 557 P.2d
302 (Wash. 1976). As Silak explains, the initiative in Olson "for the first time recogniz[ed] in
Washington the form of joint ownership of property known as joint tenancy with right of survivorship." Silak, supra note 8, at 58. The initiative clearly indicated that the new tenancy
right could be created "through a variety of documentary means," and the Washington State
legislature apparently understood this manifest meaning in passing later legislation broadly
authorizing such. Yet a majority of the Washington State Supreme Court recognized only one
means-a writing-to create the joint tenancy. Id. at 58-59. Given the situation as she laid it
out, it is hard to understand Silak's statement that "[a] greater focus on the intent of the people
in passing the joint tenancy initiative ... might have resulted in [a contrary ruling] and an
avoidance by the Supreme Court of an overly technical interpretation." Id. at 59. No sophisti-

2007] SOLVING THE "INITIATORY CONSTRUCTION" PUZZLE

277

Expanded-voter-intent searches certainly would not run afoul of the
second evaluation criterion. Far from disparaging direct democracy, they
appear to treat it preferentially by employing heroic measures to ascertain the intent of voter-legislators. Yet, expanded-voter-intent proposals
fare very poorly in terms of judicial manageability. First, there would be
the question of how courts would develop priorities among the substantially expanded universe of material to which proponents direct judicial
attention. 9 1 A second concern is how courts would assess the persuasiveness of individual pieces of alleged voter-intent evidence, even if
they knew how to prioritize them. 92 Proponents of expanded-voterintent searches might respond that this is why initiatory-construction
courts need recourse to experts, but that brings up a third worry about judicial manageability-how courts pursuing an expanded search for voter
intent would resolve a "battle of the experts" over topics, such as voter
behavior and media perceptions about which courts are especially likely
to be at sea.
Finally, expanded-voter-intent proposals raise serious legitimacy
concerns by allowing, or at least appearing to allow, courts to base initiatory construction on factors that seem so arbitrary and subjective that
they amount to judges "substituting their will" for that of the people.
One prominent proponent asserts that the inevitable suspicion of judicial
usurpation arising when judges restrict the scope of initiatives will be reduced "if it becomes obvious to the public and the media that the court
system is engaging in a careful examination of the 'legislative history'
concerning the initiated act."'9 3 Yet it is hard to credit this account of a
public more sanguine about initiatory-construction decisions because

cated voter-intent search seemed necessary for a proper ruling. The majority merely needed to
consult the design and language of the initiative itself.
91.
Silak attempts to address this concern by analogizing to the Uniform Act on legislative interpretation that applies in Idaho and other states. She notes, for example, that "the Uniform Act recognizes that 'written or printed materials that are not legislative materials' can be
given some weight" by courts interpreting statutes, but she specifies that "[t]he weight to be
given would be secondary." Silak, supra note 8, at 40 & n.223. Silak then assures that "[i]n
the same manner, the courts could develop a hierarchy of such aids that they will rely upon for
initiatives." Id. at 40. Yet the analogy seems strained because Silak envisions a substantially
larger universe of sources to sort out, many of which do not have a ready analogue in statutory

construction.
92.
These do not seem to be the kinds of questions about which judges have substantial
expertise and familiarity. Cf Landau, supra note 8, at 524-25 (criticizing, for example, Professor Schacter for committing courts to assess "information deficits" relating to media coverage yet failing to "explain how any judge may identify such a state of affairs ....[or] on what
basis a court must decide the extent to which voters were likely confused[,] ...the extent to
which the voters even attempted to read [relevant materials], or the extent to which they relied ... on reductive media coverage").
93.
Silak, supra note 8, at 42.
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their authors analyzed videotapes of campaign ads and heard from professors and politically interested "expert" officials. It seems more plausible that observing a court engaged in a wide-ranging expedition among
alleged voter-intent indicators would heighten, not soften, the perception
of the public and its leaders that the judge is playing substitute law94
maker.
2.

Generic Skepticism through More Stringently Applied
Interpretive Canons

A second, very different reform approach would apply standard interpretive canons in a generally more skeptical manner during initiatory
construction. 9 5 First, courts would subject initiatives to a "heightened"
version of "the canon counseling that, if plausible, statutes should be interpreted to avoid constitutional invalidation." 9 6 Second, courts would
turn the canon against implied repeals of existing laws into a "general
working presumption in favor of narrow construction when [laws
adopted through direct democracy] are in tension with pre-existing
law." 97 Third, judges would apply more "specialized substantive canons," such as the rule of lenity, with "somewhat more force" to initiative98
passed laws than to those adopted by legislatures.
Generic skepticism would remedy the problem of misreading voter
intent in one sense-by turning judicial attention away from unreliable
extrinsic voter-intent indicators. Yet the approach would frustrate attempts to find meaning when narrowness, caution, and skepticism are in99
consistent with the impulse behind adoption of a particular initiative.
94.
It does not help that Silak points to Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity
v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1993), as an example. Evans does not refer to the typical initiatory-construction case in which initiative terms intend to have a fixed meaning and it is the
court's job to ascertain it. Rather, the Evans court sought to clarify an admittedly amorphous
constitutional concept intended to evolve over time.
95.
See Frickey, supra note 7, at 510-526. A distinct brand of heightened skepticism
scrutiny has been a staple of scholarship about direct democracy. As Professor Staszewski has
noted, "a number of commentators" have urged more searching judicial review of initiatives
during constitutionalreview of successful initiatives. Staszewski, supra note 1, at 398 n. 12.
The most discussed of these is the heightened-scrutiny proposal of the late Professor Julian
Eule. See Julian Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990).
Eule's proposal did not necessarily apply to judicial construction of initiatives apart from constitutional review.
96.
Frickey, supra note 7, at 512.
97.
Id. at 522.
98.
Id. at 522-23.
99.
See Nagle, supra note 7, at 549-50 (explaining how Frickey approach would undercut broad remedial purposes if used to determine retroactivity of the CERCLA environmentalprotection statute).
Generic skepticism could fail to serve accurate intent finding by, at times, emphasiz-
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Many scholars point out that initiatives are often adopted to push the
constitutional envelope, or to broadly reject the status quo in favor of
significant legal, political, or social change. As a result, for a potentially
large number of initiatory-construction disputes, generic skepticism
could amount to a disproportionately overbroad remedy and might be
10 0
"too high a price to pay."
For example, a critic of generic skepticism analyzed its impact on
Calik v. Kongable.10 1 Calik disputed whether, in seeking to provide
treatment and diversion from lengthy prison sentences for nonviolent
drug offenders, Proposition 200 nevertheless allowed relatively short jail
time as part of a sentence of "probation," as permitted generally in Arizona. 10 2 In Calik the court found the preexisting general law inapplicable in cases covered by the drug-treatment proposition. 10 3 The critic argued that the generic-skepticism approach would have led to a different,
"incoherent" result because:
[An enhanced presumption against altering existing law] would...
mandate minimal displacement of preexisting law. Since preexisting
probation law provided for the possibility of jail. ...Proposition 200
should be interpreted to permit jail. As the Calik court observed,
though, such a holding would make the new law incoherent. Because
jail is expressly precluded for a violation of probation, permitting jail
upon conviction would mean that a defendant who did not violate
probation might receive harsher treatment than one who did. Indeed,
a defendant sentenced to jail would actually have an incentive to violate the terms of probation in order to avoid jail. 104
Ultimately, the commentator suggests that skeptical treatment of initiatives in conflict with existing law may "produce an incoherent legal re10 5
gime that no reasonably deliberating legislature would accept."
Generic skepticism in construing initiatives is also premised on a
fundamental dissatisfaction with direct democracy. True, generic skepticism's proponent presents the approach as a "balanced" response to direct-democracy deficiencies that manages to "respect" direct democracy
ing complicated initiative texts that, as Part I indicates, voters are not especially likely to understand. The Frickey approach would raises legitimacy concerns to the extent that it would
lead courts away from the will of "the people as lawmakers."
O'Hear, supra note 7, at 337.
100.
101.
990 P.2d 1055 (Ariz. 1999) (discussed in O'Hear, supra note 7, at 317).
102.
O'Hear, supra note 7, at 317.
Calik, 990 P.2d at 1060.
103.
104.
O'Hear, supra note 7, at 324-25; see also id. at 324 (applying Frickey approach to
another case and concluding that the resulting "odd disparity" serves "[n]o theory of punishment or drug rehabilitation").
105.
Id. at 325.
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and "the people as lawmakers." 106 Still, generic skepticism is premised
on the view that direct democracy lacks fundamental republican deliberative requisites and is "more likely than legislative lawmaking to produce
ambiguous statutory text." 10 7 And generic skepticism would require
judges to visibly treat the fruits of direct democracy as second-class
products (by subjecting them to expanded across-the-board caution), thus
running afoul of the practical realities likely to retard the actual implementation of such a plan.
Compared to enhanced-voter-intent proposals and other proposals,
broad skepticism in construing initiatives fares relatively well on the judicial manageability and legitimacy criteria. The three tools courts
would wield are tools with which judges are intimately familiar. Some
new manageability concerns would arise from judges having to make nuanced assessments about just how high to "heighten" the avoidance
canon or how much additional "force" should be used with respect to
other specialized canons, such as the rule of lenity. Still, these judgments are in the mainstream of typically manageable and legitimate judicial activity.

3.

10 8

Selective Skepticism on Substantive or Procedural
Grounds

One approach in a third (selective skepticism) category would use
several substantive criteria to "distinguish between different types of
popularly enacted statutes, giving deference when popular participation
in the lawmaking process is likely to enhance the legitimacy or operation
of the law." 10 9 This proposal would employ selective skepticism for initiatives when the initiatives "disempower[] discrete and insular minori-

106.
Frickey, supra note 7, at 523 (arguing that his approach protects "the core purposes of
the electorate").
107.
Id.at 481.
108.
See Landau, supra note 8, at 528 ("Frickey's proposal thus requires only 'subtle' differences in interpretive approach that result in judicial scrutiny only 'somewhat' more demanding ....
").
Professor O'Hear also criticizes Professor Frickey for suggesting that his generic
skepticism regime "would not preempt 'clear text' or 'evident, core purposes."' O'Hear, supra
note 7, at 323-34. Professor O'Hear points out that, at times, the text may be unclear, a purpose may not be evident, and there may be conflict between text and purpose. Id. Yet, these
difficulties seem typical of the problems that courts routinely confront in statutory construction
and do not suggest special concerns about manageability or legitimacy.
109.
Note, supra note 9, at 2766. The proponent of this approach also suggests enhanced
skepticism when an initiative "serves to circumvent the legislature" (as opposed to "[a] referendum [that] serves to affirm or reject the decision of a duly elected legislature"). Id. at 2768.
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ties," "directly interfere[] with the public fisc," or "conflict with the
commands of other statutes."l 10
Another approach would hinge selective skepticism on process
grounds-when there is reason to believe that "troubling structural inequalities" in the direct-democracy process have "increase[d] the risk of
abuse" by "highly organized, concentrated, and well-funded interests." 1 11 The proponent of this approach broadly envisions that "litigants
and courts would be required to develop factors for distinguishing" when
participants have "abused" the initiative process."l 2 To assist this factor
analysis, the proponent identifies the following as "'danger signals' that
increase the risk": when initiative texts are characterized by "length,
complexity, [or] confusing wording"; when materials provided to the
voter evince "obscurity about the effect of an affirmative vote"; when
proposition proponents engage in "heavy advertising (especially when
coded with race-based or similar symbols)"; and when "propositions ex''1
plicitly or implicitly target[] ... socially subordinated groups. 13
Compared to across-the-board skepticism about initiative-passed
legislation, proposals to selectively discriminate against the fruits of direct democracy are still problematic, albeit somewhat less so, on the proportional remediation and disparagement criteria. Selective skepticism
could warp initiatory construction through artificial narrowing and is
based on a view that direct democracy is selectively deficient. Still, the
damage would be mitigated because the proposals by definition apply to
114
a smaller category of potential initiatives.
110.
Id. at 2767-68. The author implies that skeptical treatment should also be afforded to
initiatives protecting the interests of entrenched political officials, such as legislators, and
propositions, such as anti-environmental initiatives, favoring narrow social segments instead of
"confer[ring] diffuse social benefits." Id. at 2766-67.
111.
Schacter, supra note 6, at 156-57.
112.
Id. at 159.
113.
Id. A third commentator proposes greater skepticism on another process ground:
when initiatives seek to amend state constitutions, as opposed to merely enacting new statutory
laws. This approach would "adopt a heavy presumption that proposals that are hard to classify
should be considered as legislative initiatives and therefore susceptible to subsequent modification by the legislature." Garrett, supra note 3, at 35. Because the scope of application of
Professor Garrett's interesting proposal would be significantly more limited than the other "selective skepticism" proposals, this section does not further analyze it.
114.
In the absence of detailed empirical research, it is impossible to quantify the size of
the initiative categories potentially affected by the different selective-skepticism proponents.
But from both a quantitative and qualitative standpoint, Professor Schacter's approach seems
the more disparaging. Her narrow-construction proposal emerges from an extensive cataloguing of direct democracy's failures. See Schacter, supra note 6, at 123-47. And because her
critique of direct democracy's failures suggests that initiatives would often be adopted in a
process fraught with real dangers of manipulation and abuse, her narrow-construction remedy
would quite often be invoked.
By contrast, the Harvard Note's proposal to make substantive distinctions among ini-
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Where selective skepticism seems significantly more problematic
than generic skepticism is on the manageability and legitimacy scales.
Selective skepticism would require courts to make distinctions and administer criteria that are by no means judicially manageable and legitimate. 115 Even the most seemingly objective ground put forth by the
proponent of selective skepticism on substantive grounds, whether an initiative "directly interferes with the public fisc," is fraught with difficult
characterizations inevitably raising open-ended policy questions. It is
even more doubtful that judges could discover and manage objective
standards for determining whether an initiative "advances" or retards minority rights, or is pro- or anti-environment.
Indeed, the call for judges to assess whether a given initiative campaign showed the "danger signals" of abuse and manipulation takes unmanageability to a higher plane. Even the more objective signals already
identified, such as the length and complexity of an initiative's text, may
not accurately register abuse. 116 And, even if judges adopt arbitrary
word-count limits or linguistic complexity indices-standards easily
evadable by initiative proponents as venal as this proponent assumesjudges would have to make many difficult judgments. Still less imaginable are the standards judges would use to fulfill the open-ended mandate
to "develop" additional abuse-detecting devices not specified.
These problems with judicial manageability lead directly into the
legitimacy concern. In administering both the substantive and procedural
distinctions urged by reform proponents, courts would enter policymaking waters that many judges, public officials, and members of the public
would see as illegitimate. Lack of reliable guidelines would at least create the perception, if not the reality, that judges are simply expressing
their personal policy preferences. 117
tiatives seems less disparaging for two reasons. First, the Note author has a more nuanced
view of direct democracy's pros and cons. See supra note 64 (quoting Note author's view that
direct democracy has provided important, positive legal change). Second, it seems likely that
a lower percentage of initiatives would fit into the skepticism-worthy substantive categories of
the Note author.
115.
Commendably, the proponent of selective skepticism admits that the proposed fix "is
not a tidy one" and that "[r]easonable jurists may disagree about what treatment to give a certain law." Id. at 2768.
116.
As Professor O'Hear points out, because initiative sponsors lack many of the devices
legislative proponents have for making their intent known, their desire to spell out details in
the lengthy texts might indicate responsible lawmaking, not irresponsible public hoodwinking.
O'Hear, supra note 7, at 332-33. O'Hear also argues that "slogans and soundbites" are not
necessarily "insidious" means of communicating about technically complex subjects in a mass
media age. Id. at 333-34.
117.
See Tushnet, supra note 65, at 375-76 n. 14 ("A judge who disapproves of the substance of the direct legislation will identify a defect of deliberation, invoke a higher standard of
review than would be applied to the same law adopted by a legislature, and strike the statute
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The proponent of selective skepticism based on substantive criteria
seeks to defuse this legitimacy concern by likening the value judgments
required by his proposal to those "the judiciary already incorporates...
into existing jurisprudence."'1 18 The only authority cited for this suggestion is the famous "footnote 4" from the Carolene Products decision,
which justifies stricter scrutiny for "legislation that targets underrepresented groups" such as racial minorities. 1 19 But the equal-protection jurisprudence following Carolene Products only applies to laws targeting
minorities facially or by obvious effect. Asking judges to go substantially beyond that and identify laws more diffusely "disempowering" to
minorities would assign judges a fundamentally different task and expose
1 20
them to the charge of result-oriented policymaking.
That calls for selective skepticism ultimately require much more
than typical judicial judgment is amply illustrated by California's notorious anti-affirmative-action Proposition 209. Most observers would call
the Proposition anti-minority, thus qualifying for heightened skepticism
under substance-based selective skepticism. Yet, Proposition 209 proponents argued that it served the interests of minorities by, among other
things, removing a stigma caused by the perception that "unqualified"
minority citizens gained preferential benefits they could not have earned
in legitimate competition. 12 1 It is one thing for a voter or policy advocate to reject this argument, and quite another for a court to do so. Similarly, the proposal to employ selective skepticism based on process failures would obligate judges to determine whether the advertisements
employed by Proposition 209 proponents were of a "heavy" volume and,
if so, whether that represents abuse of direct democracy or necessary expenditures by proponents urging a position out of official favor. Judges
down. A judge who approves of the legislation on the merits will identify a structural concern
that direct legislation seeks to cure, invoke a lower standard of review, and uphold the statute.").
118.
Note, supra note 9, at 2767.
119.
Id. at 2766 n.99 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938)).
120.
Professor Schacter's reductionist argument that "all interpretive rules require valueladen line drawing by judges," Schacter, supra note 6, at 160, is similarly unconvincing in this
context. Her proposal calls for a quite different order of line-drawing--demanding subtle,
controversial judgments about the validity and impacts of political processes.
121.
In their ballot-pamphlet argument for Proposition 209, proponents contended in relevant part:
Proposition 209 will stop the terrible programs which are dividing our people and
tearing us -- rt. People naturally feel resentment when the less qualified are preferred.... Let's not perpetuate the myth that "minorities" and women cannot compete without special preferences. ...
California Secretary of State 1996 General Election Website, Argument in Favor of Proposition 209, http://vote96.ss.ca.govfVote96/html/BP/209yesarg.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
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would also be committed to determining whether the arguments of
Proposition 209 proponents were "coded with race based or similar symbols"-a task that judges and others are likely to see as illegitimately
''political."
4.

Judicially Expanded Deliberation During InitiatoryConstruction Litigation

Under this proposal, judges would use initiatory construction litigation to "compensate for some of [direct democracy's typical] informational deficits and create a structure for the deliberation that was absent
from the process that produced the initiative." 122 Reflecting the belief
that "the adjudicative process can act as a complementary adjunct to the
direct lawmaking process," this proposal envisions litigants and other interested parties engaging in a more "in depth" identification of initiative
meanings. 12 3 The court would then "assign meaning to the contested
provision with the benefit of this extended exploration and the court's
124
own knowledge of the legal context in which the initiative is situated.
Thus, in many (if not most) initiatory-construction contexts, 12 5 judges
would act to "maximize[] procedural opportunities for participation by a
range of interests"; 126 at a minimum, "[i]n addition to liberally granting
applications for intervention and for amicus curiae participation, courts
should consider appointing pro bono representation for unrepresented, or
127
even unorganized, interests."
It is by no means clear whether and how this proposal would resolve
the ambiguities of initiative meaning. 128 As one critic has pointed out,
the proposal "d[oes] not explain how [expanded] hearings [would] differ
from the hearings that routinely occur concerning the proper construction
122.
Schacter, supra note 6, at 155.
123.
Id.
124.
Id.
125.
As with Professor Frickey's proposal, Schacter's would not formally apply acrossthe-board, but would seem to have a practically sweeping application. To be subject to Schacter's rule, an initiative must have terms that are arguably "ambiguous." Id. at 155 (which is
likely to be true in a large percentage of cases). The initiative must also have been adopted by
a process displaying "informational and deliberative deficits," id. at 156; yet Schacter states
that such deficits "characterize[] the direct lawmaking process generally," id. at 159.
126.
Id. at 156.
127.
Id. Schacter admits that "[t]he judicial process is not a perfect substitute for a more
robustly deliberative initiative process," but argues that litigation "can go some distance toward ameliorating the informational and deliberative deficits suggested by [her] study." Id.
128.
Ultimately, whether the proposal would in fact respond to the problems noted by initiatory-construction authors can only be assessed with more elaboration than the author of this
admittedly "preliminary" proposal provided. See O'Hear, supra note 7, at 336 ("[O]ne cannot
tell even what the terms of the debate would be.").
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of initiatives"; the critic's own experience as a state judge suggests that
current initiatory-construction hearings "frequently include extended
briefing from the parties, intervenors and amici regarding the legal and
political context, as well as competing interpretations, of the enacted
measures." 12 9 More fundamentally, the critic worries that "[h]olding a
hearing would, at best, inform the court that the voters were confused

about the effect of the measure that they nevertheless enacted into law,"
yet "do nothing to inform the court about the correct way to interpret the
law."

13 0

The call for judicially-expanded deliberation when an initiative goes
to court raises serious concerns under the remaining evaluation criteria,
primarily because "[i]n effect [the proposal] transform[s] the court into
an alternative political forum, where different interest groups can compete for the heart and mind, not of the voters, but of the judge... [who]
would then engage in a far-ranging consideration of public values in order to resolve interpretive problems." 13 1 This substitution of policymak-

ers implies fundamental disparagement-if not a basic abandonment-of
32

direct democracy. 1
Nor is it at all clear that judges are institutionally capable of manag133
ing an authentically aggressive pro-deliberative litigation process.
Among the challenging issues confronting judges embarked upon a postenactment deliberative expansion would be balancing the mandate for

"liberal" intervention against the basic need to make litigation manageable; determining which interests are "unrepresented, or even unorgan-

ized" and who is a proper representative of these interests; and ascertaining what, if any, additional measures are needed to "maximize[]
procedural opportunities for participation."' 134 And, if judicially expanded deliberation is conditional upon a judge's prior determination
135
that "informational deficits" caused initiative texts to be ambiguous,

129.
Landau, supra note 8, at 525-26.
130.
Id. at 526.
131.
O'Hear, supra note 7, at 330.
Whatever its legitimacy as a logical proposition, initiatory-construction judges might
132.
legitimately doubt that the public or its officials would be placated by an assurance that "initiative lawmaking is... an ongoing, multi-institutional process that necessarily involves voters at
one point and courts at another." Schacter, supra note 6, at 156.
133.
See Garrett, supra note 3, at 33 ("Schacter's strategy... may require courts to make
judgments for which they are not well-suited or to oversee processes that are beyond their
competence ....).
As noted earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 126-27, Professor Schacter's
134.
proposal requires due judicial consideration of all of the quoted concepts.
As noted earlier, see supra note 125, it is not clear whether an individual finding is
135.
necessary, or whether judges are generally to assume that informational deficits led to ambiguities.
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the proponent is open to the criticism that "she again failed to give any
136
clues as to how effectively to give content to such terminology."
IV. THE LARGELY OVERLOOKED SPONSOR-INTENT ALTERNATIVE

This Part develops in detail the case that initiatory-construction deficiencies can be solved by looking in a fundamentally different direction: the intent of initiative sponsors. This alternative has been largely
ignored by initiatory-construction commentators, with the exception of
Professor Glen Staszewski, whose 2003 article argued that sponsor intent
is the key factor for understanding initiatory meaning and that sponsors
should be made to employ federal-administrative-rulemaking procedures
137
to form and express their intent.
This Part briefly summarizes Professor Staszewski's important, but
limited, rationale for refocusing on sponsor intent1 3 8 and explains why it
is not surprising that previous commentators ignored the sponsor-intent
alternative. The Part then goes beyond Staszewski's exploratory work,
by providing a multi-faceted justification for valuing sponsor intent more
highly in the initiatory construction equation. Finally, the Part highlights
serious methodological and practical problems with the rulemaking paradigm Staszewski proposes for implementing an expanded sponsor-intent
refocus. 139
A.

The Sponsor-IntentInsight

Professor Staszewski correctly argues that focusing on sponsor intent would provide a "more straightforward and effective" solution to
present initiatory-construction woes than the "flawed, incomplete, or impracticable" reform proposals found in previous commentaries. 140 Focusing on sponsor intent would match the realities of the modern initiative process and provide a useful corrective for the present fruitless
search for detailed intent from a group (voters) that is extremely unlikely
136.
Landau, supra note 8, at 525 (critiquing Schacter's other proposal for preventing
process abuse); see O'Hear, supra note 7, at 336 (commenting that Schacter's pro-deliberative
proposal is "devoid of substantive guidance").
137.
See Staszewski, supra note 1, at 422-32, 447 59.
To be precise, Staszewski emphasizes the relevance of the intent of "initiative propo138.
nents," a term he defines "to include the registered sponsors of ballot measures, their hired
consultants, and those who voluntarily draft and promote measures on their behalf."
Staszewski, supra note 1, at 420 n. 106. Part V of this Article proposes a narrower definition.
As a result, initiatory-construction reformers must look outside Staszewski's model
139.
for the "appropriate" refocusing on sponsor intent that this Article advocates. Part V establishes the outlines of a proper focal adjustment.
Staszewski, supra note 1,at 399, 412.
140.
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to develop it. As a host of initiatory-construction commentators has recognized, at each phase of the initiative process (drafting, ballot qualification, electoral advocacy, etc.) "initiative proponents [act as] the driving
force" behind the initiatives.14 1 Unlike voters, sponsors usually do have
a sophisticated understanding and detailed strategic intent. 142 Refocusing on sponsor intent would therefore "allow courts to continue utilizing
an intentionalist methodology"1 4 3-that is, an approach that seeks first
and foremost to interpret texts in a manner consistent with the "intentions" of the relevant lawmaker-but with more promising results.
An enhanced sponsor-intent focus would also legitimize the second
facet of most initiatory-construction case law, the judicial reliance on
"formal" legal sources identified by Professor Schacter and confirmed by
others. 144 Because many initiative sponsors are "professionals and repeat players" in the political process, 145 they are capable of understanding the "legal context" surrounding a proposed initiative and "the technical legal jargon that is used in the text." 146 This means, as Professor
Staszewski puts it, that "[i]f... courts were expressly to acknowledge
that their use of formal legal sources of interpretive guidance was designed to convey the meaning intended by initiative proponents, rather
than the meaning intended by the voters," much of the unreality of present initiatory-construction decisionmaking "would largely disappear."

14 7

For example, correcting the focus of initiatory construction would
render plausible the unreal intent assumptions made by the California
Supreme Court in People v. Castro.14 8 This Article noted earlier how
the Castro plurality credited voters with a knowledgeable desire to preserve various California Evidence Code rules and arcane knowledge
141.
Id. at 421 (citing several direct-democracy experts); see id. at 431 (discussing "the
dominant role played by the initiative proponents in direct democracy"); id. at 420 & n. 106
(citing articles by Professors Frickey, Garrett, and Schacter for the proposition that "[initiatives] are conceived, drafted, sponsored, and promoted by identifiable individuals or groups
that favor a specific policy proposal").
142.
See id. at 433 ("[Sponsors] draft the language of proposed ballot measures and typically have sufficient expertise to understand the legal landscape into which their measures will

fit.").
143.
Id. at 400.
144.
See id. at 434.
145.
Nagle, supra note 7, at 545.
146.
Schacter, supra note 6, at 128; see, e.g., Frickey, supra note 7, at 519 (initiative sponsors are "active participants" and "frequent 'players' in the repeat game of direct democracy"
who can be expected to pay attention to legal decisions and behave accordingly); Sutro, supra
note 5, at 971 n. 127 (initiative drafters "undoubtedly ...will be familiar with any judicial significance a proposed initiative's words may contain").
147.
Staszewski, supra note 1, at 434.
148.
696 P.2d Ill (Cal. 1985).
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about the interaction of initiative provisions. 149 Attributing this knowl50
edge to the sponsors of the initiative is much more plausible. 1
A focus on sponsor intent seems preeminently logical--especially
in light of the parallel to using drafter intent in statutory construction.
This raises the question of why previous courts and commentators have
largely missed it. The answer is interesting because it points to deepseated attitudes that must be addressed if the sponsor-intent insight is to
achieve its full reform potential.
Some commentators may simply be reflexively following the judicial fixation on voter intent. 15 1 For many others, however, the failure to
draw the parallel to sponsor intent may instead reflect a very dim view
about sponsors based on the consensus critique of direct democracy's deficiencies canvassed in Part 1.152 The direct-democracy literature regularly portrays initiative sponsors as hiding their true intent behind disingenuously titled texts of inordinate length and impenetrable content,
engaging in deceptive and simplistic campaigns for voter approval, and
even opposing the initiatives of others with "Trojan Horse" alternative
initiatives. 15 3 Commentators who have debunked voter intent based in
part on misbehaving sponsors would be naturally loathe to credit their
intent.
Sponsor suspicion abounds in the writings of several key initiatoryconstruction commentators. As noted above, Professor Schacter's study
"strongly suggests" that "the informational dynamics of direct lawmaking.., create opportunities for strategic abuse of the process" by initiative sponsors. 154 Schacter further speaks in terms of sponsors "construct[ing] a desired-but largely phantom-popular intent" through
such devices as deliberately using legal terminology with which the elec-

149.
See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
150.
This is not to say that the Castro result faithfully accords with sponsor intent, when
all the relevant intent indicators are properly weighed. See Silak, supra note 8, at 51-52 (criticizing Castro majority as interfering with strong victim-rights intent behind Proposition 8).
Rather, the point is that, by either ignoring sponsor intent or by lumping sponsors in with voters, the Castro majority was not even required to confront hard evidence about the strategic
intention of sponsors.
151.
See, e.g., Sutro, supra note 5, at 974 ("The voter is the law-maker; the drafter and
proponents of the initiative are not.").
152.
The occasional negative comments about direct democracy by judges, see, e.g., Silak,
supra note 8, at 29-30 n. 174 (quoting Professor Julian Eule relating a California judge's comment that an allegedly "fraudulent" initiative "was no more misleading than any other initiative"), may indicate that other judges secretly share this dim view.
153.
As one initiatory-construction scholar noted: "Some sponsors of these ballot measures might not have had a serious hope of passing their propositions, but introduced their

measures anyway in an attempt both to confuse voters (in part, by cluttering the ballot) and to
solicit 'No' votes on all the related proposals." Coury, supra note 5, at 586.
154.
Schacter, supra note 6, at 154 (emphasis added).
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torate is unfamiliar so they can "have an unseemly private dialogue of
sorts with the courts." 155 The most prominent proponent of an enhanced
search for voter intent portrays sponsors as "deliberately" seeking to
"mislead the electorate" through unclear initiative language. 15 6 Other
initiatory-construction commentators take similar tacks, describing sponsors as having "extreme views" and purposes that may be "withheld"
from voters, 15 7 or "hav[ing] one view about the meaning of the language
58
of an initiative but [presenting] another view to the general public." 1
Even Professor Staszewski has a basically negative view of the
sponsors whose intent he nevertheless finds to be the relevant focus. His
suspicion of sponsors is evident in his statement that "much of [the initiative proponents'] discourse with the electorate is conducted in a simplistic, partisan, and sometimes misleading fashion." 15 9 Staszewski's dim
view of sponsors is also subtly implicit in his argument that the current
rules of initiatory construction "privilege" sponsor views, by reflexively
attributing to voters the sponsor views presented in ballot-pamphlet arguments. 160 In reality, initiative sponsors whose intent is often ignored
and whose ambit for establishing intent is seriously constricted are
unlikely to feel "privileged" relative to legislation drafters. (How many
legislation drafters would rather be held to a few hundred words in which
to make their case and explain their intent?) Still, the language is revealing; it relates to other more problematic assumptions explored in detail
below.
In sum, the strong suspicion of courts and commentators about initiative sponsors underlines the importance of developing the full case for
an enhanced sponsor focus and crafting appropriate procedures for clarifying sponsor intent while improving direct democracy in the process.
The remaining portions of this Article focus on that task.
B. A Comprehensive Casefor Refocusing on Sponsor Intent
Professor Staszewski's defense of an enhanced focus on sponsor intent, although persuasive, is incomplete. First, an enhanced focus on
sponsor intent should actually reduce the sponsor abuses that concern
155.
Id. at 128.
156.
Silak, supra note 8, at 36.
157.
See Sutro, supra note 5, at 949 n.22, 975.
158.
Frankel, supra note 9, at 440.
159.
Staszewski, supra note 1, at 428; see, e.g., id. at 421 ("[I]nitiative proponents typically represent particular special interests and are increasingly multimillionaires who seek to
influence public policy on their pet issues"; they also are "unelected and not sworn to uphold
the Constitution").
160.
See id. at 432-33.
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initiatory-construction scholars. Second, beyond legitimizing the intentionalist methodology dominating current initiatory construction, a focus
on sponsor intent would highlight the most relevant source for two less
popular, but extant alternatives. Third, refocusing on sponsor intent
properly accounts for the reality of the sponsor/voter relationship and
harmonizes it with several well-known models employed in analogous
legal domains. Fourth, recognizing the value of taking appropriateaccount of sponsor intent provides a new rationale for reforming the processes of initiative design and deliberation in ways reformers have long
championed but too infrequently accomplished. Finally, an appropriately
enhanced judicial focus on sponsor intent would score comparatively
well on the evaluative criteria employed in Part III-thereby avoiding the
major problems posed by the reform proposals of other initiatoryconstruction scholars.
1.

Reducing Sponsor Abuse

Although the idea may be counterintuitive, the best way to reduce
the risk of sponsor abuse is to give appropriately enhanced credence to
sponsor intent. Under the present initiatory-construction approach, sponsors know that almost everything they say during an initiative campaign
will not, to paraphrase the famous Miranda warning, be used against
them in a court of law. This creates a structure in which unethical proponents can, without fear, present one message in initiative texts and ballot-pamphlet arguments and quite another in campaign materials and
other public statements. By contrast, if initiative proponents had to be
concerned that the arguments and characterizations that now get expressed in other extrinsic materials might be used by courts, they would
have a greater incentive to ensure that these extrinsic communications
are accurate and consistent with their strategic design.
2.

Serving the Other Two Approaches Used by Modern
Initiatory-Construction Courts

Beyond legitimizing the dominant "intentionalist" model for initiatory construction, appreciating the dominant role of initiative sponsors
would also legitimize other important, but less-frequently-used initiatoryconstruction approaches.
The first of these alternatives is "purposivism," which distills "reasonable" purposes from the legislative work product and then seeks the
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interpretation most fully consonant with the attributed purposes. 16 1 To

the extent that initiatory-construction courts consider an initiative's implicit purposes, its sponsor is a far more fruitful source from which to determine them.
Recognizing the importance of initiative proponents also legitimizes

initiatory construction via the textualist approach.162 Textualism's central assumption, that legislators use statutory words to reflect a common
"ordinary and natural" meaning in light of the overall legal corpus, 163
makes sense when the legislators are knowledgeable "insider" sponsors,

rather than unknowledgeable voters. 164 An enhanced sponsor focus even
serves the variant of "soft textualism" (i.e., examining legislator intentions to confirm an interpretation suggested by resort to the relevant
text 165); initiative proponents would again be the ones likely to have spe-

cific legislative intentions.
3.

Harmonizing Sponsor/Votei Dynamics with Other
Appropriate Legal Models

Recognizing that the primary role of initiative sponsors likely gives
them the detailed legal understanding and strategic intent makes it possible to harmonize the sponsor/voter relationship with several other wellknown and well-accepted legal models.
These models involve a delegation of authority, whether official or
de facto, from those ultimately enacting positive law to individuals or entities with greater presumed expertise. All models also involve a de facto
placing of trust-sometimes willingly and sometimes begrudgingly,

161.
See LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND LAWYERNG STRATEGIES 99-101 (2006). As
one scholar has noted, initiatory-construction courts at times are guided by their sense of the
core purposes behind the enactments in question. See supra note 21.
162.
See Silak, supra note 8, at 56-59 (analyzing textualist approaches of courts in Missouri and Washington). Silak criticizes overly textual interpretations of initiatives, as does the
author of this Article. See supra note 77. However, some courts will likely continue textualist
approaches, and it is preferable that these courts have the proper tools and conceptual basis for
doing so.
163.
See, e.g., 2001 ESKRIDGE, FRCKEY & GARRETT, supra note 72, at 770-71.
164.
Cf Staszewski, supra note 1, at 434 (citing Schacter's rejection, supra note 6, at 14950, of textualism "because the legal terms of art commonly used in ballot measures are often
meaningful only to a small elite community of lawyers, judges, and knowledgeable observers").
165.
See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 569-72 (1982) (construing textual language based on plain meaning but then consulting legislative history to "confirm" statutory understanding); see 2000 ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 57, at
223-27 (discussing the "soft plain meaning rule").
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sometimes permanently and sometimes episodically-in law drafters to
act in the name of the ultimate law adopters.
Professor Staszewski makes an important contribution to the initiatory-construction scholarship by highlighting a comparison that has escaped the notice of other commentators: the analogy between administrative-agency rulemakers and initiative sponsors. As Staszewski notes,
both agency rulemakers and initiative proponents serve as "unelected
lawmakers" exercising delegated legislative power in a de facto fourth
branch of government. 166 Of course, one major difference between legislative delegation of lawmaking authority to administrative rulemakers
and voter delegation of lawmaking authority to initiative sponsors is that
rulemakers can enact binding law without approval of their principals,
whereas initiative sponsors cannot. This distinction is better accounted
for by several other models. For example, in some states legislative advisory committees can review promulgated administrative rules and suspend their operation until the legislature acts. 167 Another model including but transcending administrative experts is when reform laws written
by expert bodies or commissions (or outside interest groups) are blessed
with only minimal investigation or understanding by elected legislators.
At this point in the discussion, it is not important to choose among
these models. 168 Rather, what is significant is that under none of these
models would courts reject authoritative information about the intent of
those who originated and refined the lawmaking proposals and instead
focus only on the intent of the legislators ultimately acquiescing in (or
adopting) the outside-expert work. This is so even when rules only become law when the legislature assents (or fails to override). Under all of
the models, recourse to indicators of drafter intent usually occurs with
minimal concern for whether the ultimate legislators were aware of or
understood the intent; courts appear to either assume legislator knowledge, or recognize that a desire to avoid dwelling in details is implicit in
169
the delegations of authority and trust implicit in these arrangements.
166.

See Staszewski, supra note 1, at 434, 400, 437-38, 441 n.192. Staszewski cites two

other similarities between administrative rulemakers and initiative sponsors. First, both forms

of lawmaking deviate from the deliberative procedures that the U.S. Constitution requires for
lawmaking by elected officials. See id. at 400-01. The notion that this deviation makes rulemaking and direct democrary "inherently suspect" is criticized below. See infra text accompanying notes 174-78. Second, both forms of lawmaking raise a "concern that elected officials
will punt on difficult choices facing the polity and shift responsibility for the most controversial issues of public policy to less accountable actors." Staszewski, supra note 1, at 401.
Staszewski's valid point puts a premium on the procedural reforms to improve the directdemocracy process that this Article advocates.
167.
168.
169.

See 2001 ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 72, at 1140-41.
Part V addresses the various implications flowing from model selection.
See, e.g., 2000 ESKRIDGE, FRIcKEY & GARRETT, supra note 57, at 305 (noting Su-
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In sum, all of the possible models justify a similar and enhanced focus on
170
sponsor intent by initiatory-construction courts.
4.

Justifying Procedural Reforms in the Name of
Appropriately Enhanced Sponsor Intent

An enhanced sponsor-intent focus could provide a significant impetus to the ongoing effort to reform the procedures of direct democracy.
As explained more fully in Part V, an enhanced sponsor-intent focus
would provide useful ordering principles for analyzing and prioritizing
proposed reforms. The need to provide reliable information about spon-

sor intent to initiatory-construction courts suggests that a high value
should be placed on reforms that are most likely to register and refine

sponsor intent in an efficient manner. Crediting the logic of enhanced
sponsor intent would thereby create an important new rationale for use
17 1
by direct-democracy reformers.
5.

Eliminating the Problems Associated with Previous
Reform Proposals

Compared to the reform proposals analyzed in Part III, an appropriately enhanced focus on sponsor intent would score well on all four

evaluation criteria canvassed earlier.
First, Part IV.A noted that a nuanced focus on sponsor intent would
proportionally solve the major problems with the current initiatoryconstruction approach. The illusory hunt for voter intent would be replaced by a bona fide search for an intent that is likely to be present and
helpful. And Schacter's "paradox," i.e., the erroneous search for voter
intent via "formal sources" not well matched to voter knowledge and repreme Court reliance on "statements by a nonlegislative drafter of legislation" despite concerns about accessibility, accuracy in representing congressional intent, and risk of exaggeration).
170.
Of course, legislators adopting laws drafted and conceived by their individual legislator colleagues or legislative committees often make a similar de facto delegation of authority
and trust to their more expert colleagues. Especially on complicated or specialized legislation,
the idea that individual legislators read and understand texts and committee reports is widely
recognized as a necessary fiction.
Still, other institutional and political realities not found in the initiative-sponsor/voter
relationship limit the transferability of the legislative-drafter/legislative-enactor model. Rankand-file legislators and legislative sponsors move fluidly from one role to the other, speak the
same language, share a basic stake in system maintenance, and are subject to interlocking incentives to treat each other with minimal fairness.
171.
Professor Staszewski's article recognizes this implicitly, by first arguing that a sponsor-intent focus is relevant and then proceeding to defend his reform model as a necessary procedure for advancing a sponsor-intent focus. See supra text accompanying note 137.
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liance, 17 2 disappears when canons and assumptions about strategic intent
within the overall legal landscape are applied to initiative sponsors, who
are likely to possess the requisite knowledge and intent. As long as the
reform proposals selected for registering and refining sponsor intent focus on an appropriate range of materials for court consultation, the sponsor-intent alternative would directly and proportionally remedy consensus problems.
Second, an enhanced sponsor-intent focus would not require disparaging direct democracy. True, it would de-emphasize one partner in direct democracy (voters) and enhance emphasis on another (sponsors).
But unless one falsely equates direct democracy with voter intent, as opposed to voter assent to the details developed under a de facto delegation
of authority, no message of disparagement need be taken. At most,
judges implementing an enhanced sponsor-intent focus would need to
emphasize in their opinions that they are searching for the accurate intent
of those on whom voters relied in order to faithfully serve the will of the
people themselves.
Finally, an enhanced sponsor-intent focus would be manageable and
legitimate, so long as the range of potential sponsor-intent indicators is
well calibrated. It would not seem an unmanageable stretch for courts to
substitute "initiative drafter" for "legislative drafter," and apply standard
interpretive canons and assumptions to a new kind of sponsor. True, on
rare occasions when sponsors are unsophisticated grass-roots gadflies,
assumptions of knowledge, professionalism, and strategic intent could be
unwarranted. Courts would have to make some mildly "political" judgments in assessing these outliers. Given the high professionalism that
occasions most modern initiative drives, however, in most cases courts
could reasonably assume that initiative sponsors are as sophisticated and
system-savvy as elected officials. (In fact, often the initiative sponsors
are elected officials!) At base, measured judicial interpretation of sponsor intent where the proposed enactment is an initiative would usually be
as legitimate as interpretation of sponsor intent where the proposed enactment is legislation.
C. Avoiding Lock-Step Implementation of the FederalRulemaking
Model
Unfortunately, Professor Staszewski's important addition to the initiatory-construction scholarship falls short at the critical phase of proposing logical, workable means for redirecting the focus of initiatory con-

172.

See Schacter, supra note 6, at 130.
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struction. This part explains how two basic errors cause several flaws in
his reform proposal. Ironically, both sets of errors render Staszewski's
proposal vulnerable to the same charge that he accurately levels at his
predecessors: the proposals are "intriguing reforms," but "the willingness
73
and ability of courts to implement [them] is... open to question."'
1.

An Overly Zealous Commitment to Republican
(Legislative) Deliberation

Professor Staszewski pitches his tent in the camp of initiatoryconstruction scholars who emphasize the importance of the deliberative
process and republican checks on abuse of power associated with an idealized version of the legislative process. Like many others, Staszewski
uses "the fundamental lawmaking characteristics set forth in the federal
174
Constitution" as the "baseline requirements of republican lawmaking"'
from which to view all other lawmaking models. This is certainly a
plausible position. But it required Staszewski to confront what one initiatory-construction scholar called "a respectable body of academic writing suggesting a different conception of republican values and of the relationship between the initiative power" and United States Constitution
requirements. 175 (His over-reliance on the republican/deliberative critique also practically diminishes the real-world attractiveness of
Staszewski's proposal, by inviting opposition from courts and commentators who do not share his anti-direct-democracy point of view.)
Without engaging in extended swordplay on the substantive merits,
two examples will help to underscore Staszewski's extensive republican/deliberative commitment, and the errors it promotes. One measure
of Professor Staszewski's zeal comes in Part III.A of his article, in which
the author pursues an intricate, but ultimately circular argument about
76
"The Constitutionally Suspect Nature" of direct democracy.1
Staszewski presumes the validity to the states of Article I deliberative
requirements. Yet, after briefly noting recent scholarship suggesting that
neither the Constitution's Guarantee Clause nor the intent of the Framers
creates a constitutional barrier to direct democracy at the state level,
Staszewski offers no rebuttal. He relies instead on the softer claim that
77
"direct democracy is in serious tension" with constitutional structures.1
Yet, because Staszewski failed to explain why the federal government's

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Staszewski, supra note 1, at 411.
Id. at 439.
Landau, supra note 8, at 508.
See Staszewski, supranote 1, at 435-40.
Id. at 439 n.190.
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structural minima are even relevant to states, he fails to establish the existence of any "tension." Ultimately, he merely asserts the policy position that states "should" improve the deliberateness of direct democracy." 17 8
A similar error compounds Staszewski's other basis for finding direct democracy legally suspect. Although correctly identifying the
power of the analogy between direct democracy and administrative lawmaking, Staszewski incorrectly assumes that federal constitutional skepticism about the delegation of legislative power to non-elected administrative officials applies to state laws propounded by non-elected initiative
proponents through direct democracy. Staszewski relies on the fact that
"state courts have uniformly adopted their own versions of the nondelegation doctrine." 17 9 He notes that "[a] number of state courts, including
California, Oregon, and Washington, specifically consider whether the
lawmaking process contains adequate procedural safeguards when assessing the validity of delegations of authority to administrative agencies." 180 Yet, Staszewski fails to account for the fact that the constitutions of these three safeguard-requiring states, among others, contain
provisions expressly authorizing direct democracy and that these provisions predate the modern embodiment of state nondelegation doctrines.
The natural conclusion is that these and other direct-democracy constitutions long ago reconciled nondelegation concerns with lawmaking by initiative.
2.

A Problematic Fixation on the Federal-AdministrativeRulemaking Process

Perhaps because he sees republican deliberation and nondelegation
as "baselines" applicable to direct democracy, Professor Staszewski assumes that Federal Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") notice-andcomment procedures (including full-scale judicial review) 18 1 should be
applied wholesale to those who make law via initiative. This fixation
with APA rulemaking as the only relevant deliberation-promoting model
leads to three deficiencies seriously undermining Staszewski's reform
proposals.
First, the federal-rulemaking fixation ignores the need to adapt deliberative reforms to variations in a state's administrative procedure act

178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.

Id. at 438 n.185.
Id.
See 5 U.S.C. 553, 706(2)A & (2)D (2000).
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and the idiosyncrasies of its political and legal culture. 182 Reforming initiative procedures to enhance the development and recordation of meaningful sponsor intent, while convincing courts to pay greater attention to
sponsors, requires the acquiescence (and probably the active support) of
state judges and officials. State-specific tailoring of proposed reforms
would likely increase the comfort level of these leaders.
A second problem is that Staszewski's exclusive focus on the federal notice-and-comment rulemaking model leads him to endorse a relatively cumbersome and arguably over-elaborate deliberative approach.
Staszewski describes federal notice-and-comment rulemaking in exclusively positive terms, 183 other students of the federal administrative
process have noted the substantial costs, both in time and money, extracted by full APA compliance. 184 It would be one thing to show the
merits of the federal notice-and-comment process, in cost/benefit terms,
in comparison to other possible alternatives (including the alternative
rulemaking procedures of particular states). 18 5 But it is quite another
thing-and one substantially less likely to persuade the state officials
who would need to adopt Staszewski's proposals-to give the APA
rulemaking procedures presumed legitimacy.
The third and most important deficiency flowing from Staszewski's
commitment to the federal APA model is that he unwisely imports into
the state direct-democracy context the full judicial-review schema for
federal rulemaking. In essence, Staszewski proposes that, even after an
initiative survives constitutional challenge, it could still be invalidated,
sending its proponents back to the drawing board. 186 During potential
multiple rounds of judicial review,187 judges would probe three different
182.
One example of the difficulty this causes: Staszewski's presumption that the federalrulemaking model is per se appropriate leads him to advocate aggressive "hard look" judicial
review of whether proponents comply with relevant deliberative procedures. See Staszewski,
supra note 1, at 443-44. This in turn requires Staszewski to confront the problem that "a number of states have not adopted hard-look judicial review." Id. at 443 n.201. Staszewski's only
response to this problem is to say that the states should change their approach. See id. A reform proponent not so wedded to full congruence with the federal model could propose statesensitive alternatives that would be substantially more likely to be adopted.
183.
See Staszewski, supra note 1, at 441-47.
184.
See, e.g., CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 102-13 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing several issues detracting
from rulemaking timeliness).
185.
This is the kind of analysis that would be necessary to ensure that Staszewski's proposal constituted an appropriatelyenhanced focus on sponsor intent, and that it avoided disproportionate remedies, the first evaluation criterion discussed in Part III.B. See supra text
accompanying notes 60-61. Part V discusses some preliminary relevant considerations for the
inquiry.
186.
See Staszewski, supra note 1, at 453-54.
187.
As with review of APA rules, a court could invalidate an initiative during the first
round of judicial challenges on procedural grounds (for example, because proponents failed to
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aspects of possible initiative shortcomings: procedural violations, delib1 88
erative failures, and substantive illogic
Allowing aggressive and repetitive judicial intervention in the initiative process raises transparent questions of judicial legitimacy. These
outstrip even the more dubious proposals of Staszewski's predecessors: 189 at least Schacter's proposal for more pro-deliberative judicial
structuring envisions only one round of judicial involvement with successful initiatives. Further, the implied disparagement of direct democracy exceeds the skepticism inherent in the most disparaging reform proposals suggested by other scholars. For example, Schacter would only
allow frustration of the voter's decision at the margin, through arguably
unguided judicial reconstructions; even she does not envision courts
stopping initiatives dead in their tracks.
Because he assumes the federal rulemaking model to be the natural
and constitutionally-relevant procedure for direct democracy, Staszewski
fails to inquire whether judicial overkill would even be necessary to police new requirements that sponsors explain their intent and respond to
other views. 190 Unlike the administrative rulemaking process, in direct
democracy (as in the legislative process) several nonjudicial participants
are present to assist with "enforcement" of deliberative requirements.
The opponents of initiative proposals would have strong incentives to
call public attention to proponents who fail to respond to apt criticisms or
who respond in illogical ways. The media could also be expected to give
substantially more attention to public deliberations and disputes about
initiatives than to relatively more staid and complex administrativeadequately respond to an opponent's policy argument). One or more additional notice-andcomment proceedings on the same or an amended initiative proposal could lead to new procedural problems, generating new rounds of judicial review with the potential to send an adopted
initiative back for yet further procedures. Even if proponents eventually got the procedures
right, a court could still invalidate an initiative at a later time for substantive deficiencies during "arbitrary and capricious" review. If the administrative rulemaking process is an example,
many years could pass between initial proposal of the initiative and its ultimate success or failure.
188.
See Staszewski, supra note 1,at 453-54.
189.
Staszewski anticipates judicial-legitimacy questions by responding that "[tihe initiative proponents who control the lawmaking process are hardly a coequal branch of government-or even elected officials who are held accountable for their decisions by significant institutional constraints." Id. at 472. He implies that judges should feel less compunction about
frustrating the goals of these marginally legitimate actors. Yet, this fails to confront the reality
that initiatives do not become law until "the people" give them very real, albeit uninformed,
democratic assent. As a result, Staszewski's assertion that "impos[ing] ...additional procedural requirements on initiative proponents is not inconsistent with a 'reservation' of direct
lawmaking authority for 'the people,"' id., remains unpersuasive. Voter approval is a new part
of the equation that those who would impose onerous procedural barriers need to consider.
190.
In the language of the first evaluation criterion, Staszewski's judicial-review proposal
would be a highly disproportionate remedy.
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rulemaking discussions. Under the enhanced-sponsor-intent paradigm,
initiative proponents should fear not responding adequately to the way
participants in deliberations characterize the intended operation of proposed initiative terms, the rationales behind their proposals, and other
relevant dimensions. A nonexistent or inadequate response would risk
creating "negative legislative history" that could come back to haunt
proponents during later initiatory construction.
V.

HARVESTING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF AN ENHANCED SPONSOR-

INTENT FOCUS

Seeing the value of an enhanced sponsor-intent focus, but avoiding
lock-step adoption of federal rulemaking procedures replete with judicial
enforcement and "hard look" review, clears the way for important practical improvements in the procedures of direct democracy. With enhanced
sponsor intent as their lodestar, direct-democracy reformers could analyze proposed reforms, including exemplary practices actually in place in
some states, and design optimal procedures for causing sponsors to refine
and register their intent.
A full elaboration of these possibilities is beyond the scope of this
article. 19 1 Yet, this Part notes three relevant issues and several possible
approaches-in part, so that other initiatory-construction scholars might
be encouraged to assist with the field work.
A.

Refining and RegisteringSponsor Intent

If initiatory-construction courts should be paying more overt attention to the intent of initiative sponsors, sponsors must have appropriate
incentives and mechanisms for forming and formalizing their intentions.
Professor Staszewski's proposed use of federal informal-rulemaking procedures provides one promising avenue. When a federal agency proposes a rule, it is required to think and write about the existing legal context in which its proposed rule change would operate, provide a detailed
explanation of the need for the proposed change, and expound in detail
about what the proposed rule would and would not do. 192 Many state
rulemaking schemes follow the federal APA's "statement of basis and

191.
This Article's author is at work on a detailed analysis, to be published separately, of
how current California procedures for rulemaking, legislation, and direct-democracy could be
adapted to ensure that sponsors register authoritative intent and participate in meaningful policy-formulation discussions with state officials and the public.
192.
See Staszewski, supra note 1, at 449.
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purpose" model 19 3 ; in these states, the existing legal requirements could
probably be imported into the direct-democracy context with little alteration. Or, a state may have refined its rulemaking process in ways that
94
would be appropriate for direct democracy. 1
The administrative-rule-proposing model is not the only promising
one, however. Another analogy is the process for executive or legislative
review of rules-with initiative sponsors playing the role of rulemakers
and voters playing the role of executive or legislative reviewers. 195 To
the extent that different information-submission procedures are used for
these processes at the federal or state level, additional potentially appropriate models arise. Or, promising elements might be borrowed from the
various impact statements-environmental and otherwise-required of
administrative rulemakers and, at times, legislators. 196 Perhaps drafters
should have to file an "initiative impact statement," detailing how their
proposal would, and would not, impact the existing and future legal, social, and political environments of the state.
Regardless of the specific model employed, on both substantive and
practical grounds the process should be targeted to achieve maximum
useful information (perhaps by asking sponsors to address a series of detailed questions) with minimal unnecessary burden or verbosity. Achieving the proper balance is important to all who would use the intent register directly, i.e., initiatory-construction courts, especially motivated
members of the voting public, and those in officialdom, the media, and
interest groups who would communicate with voters about sponsor intent. The sponsor-intent register should be a discrete document, representing only the views of the prime sponsor and meaningfully distinguishable
from
the prime
sponsor's
other
electioneering
communications.

193.

See 5 U.S.C. 553(b) (2000).

194.
As noted in Part III, see supra text accompanying notes 66-70, working within a
state's legal tradition, rather than imposing a potentially foreign federal model, has substantial
practical advantages.
195.
See supra text accompanying note 167.
196.
See, e.g., 2000 ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 57, at 180, 188 (noting
requirements that proponents of legislation analyze impact of "unfunded mandates" on state
and local governments during consideration of budget acts and delineate "tax simplicity" implications during committee consideration of significant tax measures); id. at 188 ("Congress
is considering various proposals to impose procedural frameworks on the consideration of
most regulatory bills."); KERWIN, supra note 184, at 59-61 (summarizing "information statutes" requiring administrative agencies to disclose positions about environmental, smallbusiness, and paperwork issues).
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B. Encouraging-EvenRequiring-SponsorConsultation with
Public Officials and Other Expert and InterestedParties
A well-conceived consultation process could respond to the frequent
criticism that initiative sponsors too rarely interact with public officials,
private experts, and interest groups. Two main advantages would flow
from an expanded dialogue. First, sponsors would benefit from the useful substantive information, understanding about existing law, and drafting expertise that public and private experts could provide. This could
produce more specific and refined sponsor intent, reduce drafting errors,
and lessen unforeseen consequences. Second, as noted earlier, 197 consultation with interested parties would serve as an important deliberative
check on sponsors-it would force them to deal with the perspectives of
important constituencies and to respond to criticisms upon pain of making adverse "legislative history."
In selecting the optimal consultative procedures from the wide variety of models available, initiatory-construction reformers need to confront a number of questions about the degree of formality and timing.
For example, if informal, non-public consultation is all that is desired or
possible, reformers could follow the lead of states requiring sponsors to
consult with relevant state officials, such as lawyers in the secretary of
state's office, before submitting an initiative proposal for the ballot. 198
Or, reformers could adapt the largely non-public consultative processes
accompanying executive-level review of administrative regulations at the
federal and state levels.
If, instead, reformers wish to trigger a more public consultation
process-among other reasons, so that sponsors will be forced to heed
expert advice or explain publicly why they did not, thereby creating useful evidence of intent-several models are available. Certainly the
"comment" part of the federal notice-and-comment rulemaking process
is one useful alternative. By requiring proponents of legal change to
seek written or oral input within a structured process, and then to respond
to received comments when publishing a final "statement of basis and
purpose" explaining the new law, rulemaking procedures mimicking or
adapting the federal APA could substitute for the deliberation many find
lacking in direct democracy. 199 Another alternative is the legislativeSee supra, Part IV.B.1.
See, e.g., Silak, supra note 8, at 7-8 (describing Idaho process in which Attorney
reviews proposed initiatives, in consultation with proponent, "for substance" and, on
advisory" basis, "may recommend... revisions or alterations .. . deemed necessary
and appropriate"); Tomquist, supra note 7, at 683-84 (noting Oregon Attorney General's provision of "advice regarding the eligibility of initiatives").
199.
See Staszewski, supra note 1, at 449-50 (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5
197.
198.
General
"merely
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type hearing. For example, reformers could look to states in which initiatives are considered at legislative hearings-and sometimes discussed
in committee reports and other legislative deliberations-as part of the
"indirect initiative" process.2 0 0 Or, public hearings about initiative proposals could be an additional requirement for a process leading to direct
voter approval.2 0 1 A well handled legislature-led consultation process
could provide meaningful participation by major experts and interests
while avoiding the delays and over-formalization for which the federal
202
rulemaking process has been criticized.
An additional option for conducting, or at least initiating, a more
public-deliberation process is review by executive-branch officials or
outside experts. For example, Massachusetts uses a public "certification" process in which the state attorney general must review a proposed
initiative before it is circulated for voter signatures and approval. 20 3 This
executive-review process is limited to compliance with constitutional
provisions, including single-subject rules, but nothing prevents any state
from expanding the list of review criteria or involving private interest
groups or experts formally or informally in executive-official review.
Thus, Oregon's Secretary of State arranged for a committee of lawschool deans to "review[] initiatives and make[] suggestions concerning
their constitutionality"; the committee's recommendations are available
20 4
to the public via the ballot pamphlet.
The question of when to require consultation also raises interesting
issues and possibilities. As is implicit in some of the suggestions just re20 5
viewed, reformers might wish to "front load" the consultation process.
This would respond to the common criticism that direct-democracy procedures prevent initiative proponents from responding when pre-election
U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000)).
200.
See, e.g., id. at 447 n.213.
201.
See, e.g., CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING
CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 22 (1992) (noting that "other states such as
Colorado conduct public hearings before circulation [of initiatives for voter approval] begins"); Staszewski, supra note 1, at 448 n.213 (noting requirement that Nebraska Secretary of
State subject initiative proposals to "public hearings ... in each congressional district ... no
more than 8 weeks prior to the general election" (quoting NEB. SEC'Y OF STATE, HOW TO USE
THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PROCESS INNEBRASKA Part lI.B.3(b))).
202.
See KERWIN, supra note 184, at 102-13 (discussing rulemaking delays).
203.
See Alexander G. Gray, Jr. & Thomas R. Kiley, The Initiative and Referendum in
Massachusetts, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 27, 29 (1991). Utah has a similar pre-petitioncirculation review process involving the Lieutenant Governor and the Attorney General. See
Oldroyd, supra note 70, at 369-70.
204.
Tornquist, supra note 7, at 685.
205.
See id. at 678-79 (proposing pre-circulation review of initiatives by "the legislative
counsel or some other knowledgeable expert or group of experts," and urging that expert
evaluation be publicly available).
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debates suggest that change is needed. Here, the federal ANPR ("advanced notice of proposed rulemaking") process, in which agencies trigger public input during proposal formulation by circulating a more preliminary concept or asking for comment on specific threshold
inquiries, 206 could be a useful starting point for further adaptation. Alternatively, reformers might decide that it is more important to trigger
deliberations after an initiative has been proposed or qualified. Their
thinking might be that the political culture surrounding their state's direct-democracy process makes it unlikely that pre-proposal consultations
would be fruitful or that initiative proponents would be willing to modify
their proposals to accommodate potential criticism. If the initiative process seems consigned to highly contentious arguments, it might seem
more important to use the consultation process to force supporters to re207
spond to their critics, elaborating sponsor thinking along the way.
C.

The Direct Involvement of Voters

A last question faced by designers of improved procedures for discerning sponsor intent is the extent to which the public should be involved directly. The question might seem heretical, given the importance usually attached to public participation in the legislative and
rulemaking processes. Indeed, from Professor Staszewski's position that
the federal rulemaking model should be fully imported into the directdemocracy process, the right of individual members of the public to participate would be assumed.
Through the lens of enhancing appropriate focus on sponsor intent,
however, the question would be whether direct participation by members
of the public, as opposed to indirect representation through surrogates
such as public officials and interest-group leaders, would increase the
clarity of sponsor intentions enough to make it worth the potential delays
inherent in direct voter participation. Certainly, the experience with federal rulemaking is instructive. Highly controversial rules can generate
thousands of individualized comments, which consume significant resources, even if they are not carefully analyzed and responded to by the
rulemakers. 20 8 This risk is greatest when initiatives are likely to offend
206.
See KERWIN, supra note 184, at 170.
207.
In theory, both pre-proposal and post-proposal consultation rounds could be required;
this might, however, be politically unrealistic overkill in practice. Another alternative would
be to require post-proposal consultation, but encourage pre-proposal consultation by waiving
(or reducing) post-proposal consultation requirements if sponsors engage in deliberations before finalizing initiative language.
208.
See KERWIN, supra note 184, at 172 (regulatory-strategy hearings with 3100 publicmeeting attendees and 110,000 individual letters; proposed food-labeling rule generating
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powerful interest groups, which then generate letter-writing campaigns.
Extensive voter participation could risk turning a public consultation
process intended to elicit the substantive thinking of initiative proponents
and opponents into another venue for unsophisticated political wrangling.
VI. Two CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The initiatory-construction scholarship reflects a strong consensus
about fundamental deficiencies in the dominant approach judges use to
give meaning to popularly enacted legislation. Unfortunately, the scholarship reveals no similar consensus about how to fix the broken initiatory-construction process; all the proposals are deficient when evaluated
under four major criteria. In 2003, Professor Staszewski pointed the way
to a promising new direction for improving initiatory construction-a direction implicit in previous scholarship and the statutory-construction
analogy. Refocusing on the intent of initiative sponsors would indeed
legitimate the prevailing intent-based judicial approach and achieve numerous other advantages. But lock-step insistence that initiative sponsors develop and test their intentions through an "agency model" would
be unjustified, unwise, and impolitic. This Article instead suggests a
fresh vantage point from which it is possible to compare rulemaking's
merits to other promising options for improving the way that sponsors
register their detailed intentions, in consultation--or at least through adversary wrangling-with public officials, private experts, and important
interest-group representatives. Those who wish to improve judicial construction of initiatives can then conduct a detailed, state-specific assessment leading to optimal procedures also improving direct democracy in
the bargain.
In concluding, two additional points about future field work deserve
a brief treatment. First, it is important to recognize the ongoing sagacity
of Professor Garrett's observation that empirical studies of direct democracy are needed "to provide the.., foundation for thoughtful and effective reform." 20 9 An impressionistic appreciation of a particular state's
political and legal cultures is one important ingredient of designing optimal processes for registering and perfecting sponsor intent. Yet, it would
be highly desirable for the creative work to benefit specifically from detailed, and, where possible, empirical, studies of the relative strengths
and weaknesses of the procedures different states use for direct democracy.
10,000 public comments).
209.
Garrett, supra note 3, at 27.
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Second, for those interested in further work at the arsenal of statutory-construction canons, the sponsor-intent insight opens the way to fulfilling a possibility previous initiatory-construction scholars have
noted-the application of statutory-construction canons and presumptions in a manner sensibly reflecting the differences between direct democracy and representative lawmaking. From the perspective of an enhanced focus on sponsor intent, it is possible to develop differential
canonical approaches that, unlike some of the proposals analyzed in this
Article, are founded on an appreciation, rather than a disparagement, of
direct democracy's different dynamics. Ultimately, it should be possible
to develop an interpretive taxonomy distinguishing "sponsor's canons"
(i.e., canons, presumptions, and other interpretive tools accurately reflecting the realities of how sponsors operate in drafting and championing initiatives) from "voter's canons" (i.e., canons that attribute false sagacity to voters, and should remain unfired lest they lead interpreters to
2 10
repeat past mistakes).
These and other potential advances await initiatory-construction
scholars and other participants in the direct-democracy process, if only
they will adopt an appropriately enhanced focus on sponsor intent.

210.
Here, too, the fruits of empirical research from the worlds of political science, policy,
and law could be very helpful in separating fact from fiction.
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